(By the Chief Justice)

These are petitions for quo warranto against Srimathi Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India, Thiru M. Karunanidhi, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, and the members of his Council of Ministers. On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President, acting under Art. 85(2)(b) of the Constitution, dissolved the House of the People, with effect from 27th December 1970. He took the step in view of her statement that she wished to seek a fresh mandate of the people to enable her Government to implement effectively the socialistic and secular programme and policies. In her broadcast the same day, she announced that fresh elections would be held in a couple of months, and that until the new Government was formed, her Cabinet would continue to function. Likewise, acting on the advice of the Chief Minister, the Governor, in exercise of his powers under Art. 174(2)(b) dissolved the Legislative Assembly of the State with effect from 4th January 1971. The Chief Ministers advice was made with a view to obtain a fresh mandate from the people to enable the State Government to implement mere effectively the socialistic and secular programmes and policies. Since then, the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister has been continuing to function as before, until elections are held to the Assembly and a new Council is formed. The petitioners maintain that, with the dissolution of the House of the People and the Legislative Assembly, the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister, as well as the members of his Council of Ministers, ceased to have constitutional authority to hold and function in their respective offices. Before going into this question, we have first to dispose of a preliminary objection raised by the respondents as to the maintainability of the petitions. Though in her counter-affidavit the Prime Minister raised the objection, like the Chief Minister in his counter-affidavit, the learned Attorney General, appearing for her, did not pursue it. But the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu contended that the petitioners had no personal or direct interest in the matter of continuance of the existing Council of Ministers, so as to enable them to invoke the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution. He said that their personal rights were not in any way affected and they were neither aggrieved in any way, nor suffered any personal injury, and that, therefore, they were not entitled to question the validity of the continuance of the Ministry, by applying for writs of quo warranto . In our opinion, his objection should fail. The writ of quo warranto is of British origin. Originally, the writ was used by the King as of right, against encroachment of the Royal rights, franchise, or liberties. It was a civil writ at the suit of the Crown. The writ, however, fell into disease, and led to the substitution of proceedings by way of information in the nature of quo warranto . In such proceedings, the practice of filing information by the Attorney General came into vogue. Still later, the Kings Coroner commenced the practice of exhibiting information of quo warranto at the instance of private person, and this power would appear to have been largely restrained by statute to prevent malicious proceedings by such persons. The Kings Coroner, in view of the then statutory provisions, did not file information without the order of the court. 9 Anne. C. 20 was passed to render informations in the nature of quo warranto more speedy and effectual and for the more easy trial of the rights of offices and franchise in corporations and boroughs. Chief Justices Lord Reading points out in Rex v. Speyer and Rex v. Cassel (1916)1 K.B. 595 that “Since that time there has been a tendency to extend the remedy, subject to the discretion of the court to grant or refuse informations to private prosecutors according to the facts and circumstances of the case. ..”

It appears that in Darley v. The Queen 12 Cl. and F. 537, the Judges were