Rent Controller competent to correct errors.

Same point arises in these two revisions; hence a common order. Indeed, parties are the same and both the Tribunals below passed a common order.

2. The respondent-landlady instituted R.C.O.P.No. 16/82 for eviction under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960 and R.C.O.P.No.15/82 for fixation of fair rent against her tenant, the petitioner herein. In the two petitions she described the tenant in the cause title as “M/s. Venson Transport, represented by its Manager”. In the tenant’s counter in both the petitions it is contended that the Manager is only a paid servant who had no authority to deal with the tenancy, that it is only a registered firm who has a managing partner, who alone has authority to deal with the tenancy and therefore, the petitions as framed are not maintainable. Consequently, the respondent herein filed I.A.Nos. 173 of 1983 and 172 of 1983 in R.C.O.P.Nos.16 and 15 of 1983 respectively for substituting “Managing Partner” in the place of ‘Manager’ in the cause title and also in paragraph 2 of the petitions. The applications were ordered by the Rent Controller. The petitioner filed R.C.A.Nos.46 and 45 of 1984 and they were dismissed by the Appellate Authority. Hence these two revisions.

3. In my anxious consideration, the petitioner’s argument that the applications are for amending the petition, that neither the provisions in the Act nor the rule permit any such amendment and therefore, the orders of the Tribunal below are without jurisdiction and that consequently, the revisions should be allowed though rather tempting, but on a closer examination is found to be rather misconceived. For not only in the cause title but also in the body of both the petitions the (respondent (tenant) is shown as “M/s. Venson Transports”. Further, the reliefs claimed are directed against such respondent, who is doing transport business but not against the Manager. In paragraph 9 in R.C.O.P.No.16 of 1982, the relief claimed is, ‘to pass a judgment and decree evicting the respondent from the schedule premises and directing the respondent to put the petitioner in possession while in paragraph 10 in R.C.O.P.N0.15/82 the relief claimed is, ‘to pass a judgment and decree fixing the fair rent of Rs.970/- for the suit building from 1.6.1981 and directing the respondent to pay the same till delivery of possession." I may immediately point out that the respondent is "Venson Transports". Thus it is beyond doubt that the tenant is M/s. Venson Transports carrying on transport business. Above all, both in the cause title and in paragraph 2 in both the petitions what is stated is. M/s. Venson Transport by its Manager. In the above circumstances it is a misnomer to call it a correction or as an amendment to the petitions. It may not be out of place to point out that a manager acts on behalf of his master and that in certain cases he is also empowered to prosecute and defend proceedings on behalf of his master. Indeed only in the counter it is pleaded that the Manager had no authority to deal with the tenancy. Then, I am of the firm conviction that what was permitted by the Tribunals below is not an amendment to the pleadings but merely an error in naming the person representing the respondent-tenant.

4. There are judicial precedents of this court wherein it was held that the Rent Controller possesses the ‘inherent power to amend the door number and to permit the parties to re-open the case even after the Rent Controller had reserved judgment but before the judgment is actually delivered (See. Raman Nair v. Govindasami Naidu, (1963)2 M.L.J.19. I follow the principle settled by Ramachandra Iyer, C.J. and held that the Rent Controller has inherent power to permit such corrections as has been ordered in these two petitions.

5. Leanred Counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the decision reported in Ponnammal v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, (1985) 98 L.W.47. This decision has