The Director's revision power under S. 5(2) of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, can only be invoked upon a petition filed by a person aggrieved by an order, act, or proceeding of a Settlement Officer. The Director does not have suo motu revision power.

This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 3500 of 1982. That writ petition was preferred by the respondent herein as petitioner therein, questioning the show cause notice dated 11.3.1982 issued by the appellant herein, who is the respondent in the writ petition, for exercising suo motu powers of revision under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. It is convenient for us it we refer to the parties in this judgment of ours as per their nomenclature in the writ petition, In view of the fact that the only question that was sought to be resolved before the learned single Judge and again before us is as to whether the respondent is vested with suo motu power of revision under S. 5 (2) of the Act, it is not necessary to traverse upon the factual features. Suffice it to state that what the respondent has ventured to do is only suo motu power of revision under the cover of S. 5(2) of the Act. S. 5(2) of the Act reads as follows:

“Every Settlement Officer shall be subordinate to the Director and shall be guided by such lawful instructions as he may issue from time to time; and the Director shall also have power to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer, other then those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal.”

A bare reading of S. 5(2) of the Act does not give any indication as to whether the power to cancel or revise, conferred on the respondent could be exercised on application or suo motu , S. 67 of the Act embodies the rule-making power and Clause (b) of Sub-S. (2) of S. 67 contemplates framing of rules with regard to the procedure to be followed by the Tribunals, Special Tribunal, authorities and officers appointed or having jurisdiction under the Act. Rules have been framed and published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 5.2.1983 pursuant to this power read with sub-S. (2) of the S. 5 of the Act; as well as Clauses (c) and (d) of S. 7 of the Act with which we are not concerned. Rul e 1 alone is relevant and it reads as follows:—

“(1) Any person who objects to any of the orders, acts or proceedings of a Settlement Officer, other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal may prefer a revision petition to the Director.

(2) Any such petition shall be preferred within one month from the date on which these Rules are published in the Fort St. George Gazette or within two months from the date of communication of the order or proceeding of the Settlement Officer, whichever of the dates aforesaid is the latest:

Provided that the Director may admit a petition preferred after the period aforesaid if he is satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the said period.”

Thus, we find that the procedure to be followed by the Director under S. 5(2) of the Act has been settled by the Rules, Sub-Rule(1) of the Rule speaks about any person objecting to any of the orders, acts or proceedings of a Settlement Officer other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal preferring a revision petition to the Director. Sub-Rule(2) of rule 1 lays down that any such petition shall be preferred within one month from the date on which those Rules are published in the Fort St. George Gazette or within two months from the date of communication of the order or proceedings of the Settlement Officer, whichever of the dates aforesaid is the latest. The Proviso empowers the Director to admit a petition preferred after the period aforesaid if he is satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the said period. It must be made clear at this juncture itself that we are not concerned with the question of limitation which may arise when a petition for revision is preferred and as to how far the Director could exercise the power of condonation of delay under the co