The denial of backwages can only be justified if the employee is at fault in not performing duties, and if the employee is willing to work and not incapacitated, the denial of backwages is unjustified.

1. The petitioner prays for issuance of a Writ in the nature of Certiorari, to quash the order dated 07.11.2002, passed by the Assistant General Manager, Region II, State Bank of India, Thiruchirappalli, denying to the petitioner the benefit of backwages.

2. The admitted facts of the case, are that the petitioner is working as an Assistant (Accounts) with the State Bank of India at Main Branch, Thanjavur. The petitioner was earlier appointed as award staff in the main branch of State Bank of India, Thanjavur.

3. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner under Section 498(A) I.P.C., read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohition Act. The petitioner was convicted by the learned Additional Sessions cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramanadapuram on 03.11.1997 and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-.

4. The petitioner was discharged from service, on account of his conviction by the Criminal Court. The ground for dismissal was, that the conduct leading to the conviction of the petitioner amounted to moral turpitude, which entitled the respondents to dispense with the services of the petitioner.

5. It is not in dispute that the discharge of the petitioner was solely based on the conviction by the Criminal Court and no departmental proceedings were held against him.

6. The petitioner preferred an Appeal against his conviction and sentence. The sentence awarded to the petitioner was suspended and thereafter, the appeal was allowed vide Judgment dated 22.02.2002, acquitting the petitioner of the charge.

7. The petitioner had challenged the order of discharge by filing W.P.No.12056 of 1999. The writ petition was filed pending criminal appeal. The writ was dismissed, being pre-mature.

8. However, the petitioner was given liberty to work out his remedy, depending on the outcome of the criminal appeal.

9. The petitioner, after acquittal made a request for his reinstatement. His request was partly accepted, and by way of the impugned order, while reinstating the petitioner with continuity of service and other benefit, the petitioner was denied the backwages. The impugned order reads as under:-

"Request for Reinstatement Please refer to our letter No.AGM II/12/1815 dated 07.06.1999 discharging you from Banks Service and your letter No.Nil dated 22.04.2002 requesting your reinstatement.

2. In this connection it has been decided to reinstate you in service at THANJAVUR BRANCH.

3. Please note that you are reinstated with continuity of service but without back wages.

4. Please therefore report immediately to the THANJAVUR BRANCH".

10. The petitioner made a representation against the impugned order by claiming the backwages. The second respondent vide order dated 16.08.2005 rejected the request of the petitioner for grant of backwages.

11. The petitioner, thereafter, has approached this Court by filing this writ petition.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner, vehemently contends that the impugned part of the order, denying backwages to the petitioner, cannot be sustained in law, as the only reason for his discharge was the conviction by the Criminal Court. Therefore, on acquittal, the petitioner was entitled to all the benefits, including backwages, as the decision of the Court always operates retrospectively, therefore for all intended purpose, he was innocent right from the date of registration of F.I.R against him. The order of discharge therefore was contrary to law.

13. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the respondent at no stage had instituted departmental proceedings and the order was based on conviction by the Criminal Court, therefore, on acquittal, respondents were bound to restore status quo anti to the petitioner, which entitled him of the consequential benefits arising from reinstatement in service.

14. In support of the contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in T