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2002 Supreme(Mad) 255

High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C. NAGAPPAN
MANAGEMENT OF CHERAN TRANSPORT CORPORATION LIMITED
Versus
PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL
W.P.4404 Of 1996
Decided On : 02-04-2002

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appearing Parties:D. Hariparanthaman, Advocate.

Opportunity to defend not given to delinquent.

Headnote:Service Law-Dismissal-Driver of Transport Company dismissed from service on the allegation of misconduct after completing formalities of domestic enquiry-Rejection of petition filed by Management for according approval of the dismissal order-Writ petition by Management-Held, principles of natural justice violated-Opportunity to defend be given to delinquent-Writ petition dismissed.

Judgment :

C. NAGAPPAN, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner is the Management of cheran Transport Corporation Limited and it has prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari to quash the order of the first respondent in approval Petition No. 53 of 1993 in I. D. No. 62 of 1982, dated September 13, 1995.

( 2 ) BRIEFLY, the facts of the case are as follows: The second respondent was working as a driver in the Tiruppur branch of the petitioner Corporation and on May 26, 1989, he was driving Corporation bus in the route from Trichy to Tiruppur. Near Vellaikoil, the checking Inspector tried to stop the bus for the purpose of boarding it to check whether the tickets were properly issued by the conductor. Even though the Checking Inspector showed the diary, the second respondent did not stop the bus and went to a distance of 300 feet and only thereafter stopped the bus. The Checking inspector boarded the bus and asked the second respondent as to why he did not stop the bus even after he indicated to stop the bus by showing the diary. The second respondent retorted by saying that he could drive the vehicle only that speed in view of the time allotted for the journey. He further told the checking Inspector that he should not ask irrelevant questions and shouted at the checking Inspector and abused him. The petitioner Corporation issued a charge memorandum to the second respondent for the above misconduct under Standing Order 14 (a), (b), (k) and (u) and the second respondent was also placed under suspension. The explanation submitted by the second respondent was found to be not satisfactory and domestic enquiry was held on various dates. Eventually, on March 1, 1990, the Enquiry Officer has submitted his findings that the charge against the second respondent has been proved. The management accepted the findings and issued a second show cause notice to the second respondent proposing the penalty of dismissal from service. The second respondent submitted his explanation dated May 30, 1990 and the management dismissed the second respondent from service by order dated June 20, 1990. Since the dispute regarding bonus was pending before the first respondent, the management sought approval of its action under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and filed an Approval Petition No. 53 of 1990 before the first respondent. The first respondent, by his order dated September 13, 1995 held that the punishment is disproportionate to the charge and rejected the petition. The petitioner, namely, the management filed the present writ petition seeking to quash the order of the first respondent dated September 13, 1995. The petitioner has stated that the power under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is very limited and is restricted to finding out whether a prima facie case has been made out and the first respondent cannot go into the question as to whether the punishment is disproportionate to the charge and since the first respondent has exceeded his jurisdiction in going into that question, the order is liable to be quashed. The petitioner has further stated that the first respondent has erred in coming to the conclusion that a reasonable opportunity has not been given to the second respondent on the ground that his representative was not permitted to assist him in the domestic enquiry and the first respondent has failed to note that no prejudice was caused to the second respondent. The petitioner has further stated that the first respondent has erred in coming to the conclusion that the action of the management amounted to victimisation and unfair labour practice.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the scope of the power under section 33

(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is very limited and it is restricted only to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out and only under Section 11-A of the Act, the labour Court or the Tribunal has the power to decide whether the punishment is disproportionate to the charge and the









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