The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'interlocutory order' and its applicability to the Prevention of Corruption Act, leading to the conclusion that an order declining to discharge an accused under the PCA is an intermediate order against which revision lies.

1. Challenging the order of the Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act, Dharmapuri dated 10.12.2008 dismissing the petition in C.M.P.No.42 of 2008 in C.C.No.18 of 2008 thereby declining to discharge the petitioner herein, who is the 6th Accused in the said case, he has come forward with this revision.

2. According to the final report submitted by the respondent, there are totally 18 accused including the petitioner. It is alleged that all the 18 accused have committed offences U/s.120(B) r/w 167, 409, 419, 420, 468 r/w 471 of IPC and U/s.13(1)(c) and (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 [in short "the PCA"]. Contending that there are no materials on record to frame charges against him, the petitioner [A6] filed C.M.P.No.42 of 2008 for discharge. The trial Court dismissed the same. That is how, he is now before this Court with this revision.

3. At the outset, Mr.N.R.Elango, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of this revision. According to him, the impugned order declining to discharge the petitioner from the case is an interlocutory order and, therefore, this revision is not maintainable. To substantiate his contention, he relies on a recent judgement of the Delhi High Court in Dharambir Khattar v. CBI, 159 (2009) Delhi Law Times 636.

4. Per contra, Mr.A.Ramesh, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the order impugned is neither an interlocutory order nor a final order. But, it is an intermediate order against which revision lies. To substantiate his contention, he would rely on a judgement of the Honble Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 followed by this court in V.R.Nedunchezhian v. State, 2000 Crl.L.J. 2955. He would further submit that in Dharambir Khattars case cited supra, the Delhi High Court has not decided the law correctly.

5. Indisputably, under Section 397 (2) of the Code, the powers of revision conferred under Section 397 (1) of the Code shall not be exercised in relation to an "interlocutory order" passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings. However, the term "interlocutory order" has not been defined anywhere in the Code. On more than one occasion, the Honble Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the term "interlocutory order". Finally, the Honble Supreme Court in Madhu Limayes case cited supra, set the controversy at rest, by holding that an order declining to discharge an accused is neither a final order nor an interlocutory order. It can be termed as either as an "intermediate order" or a "quasi final order". The Honble Supreme Court has further held that such an intermediate order or quasi final order is revisable under Section 397 (1) of the Code.

6. In V.C.Shukla Vs. C.B.I., AIR 1980 SC 962, the Honble Supreme Court had to again consider the construction of the term "interlocutory order" in terms of Section 11 (1) of The Special Courts Act [in short, "the SCA"]. The Honble Supreme Court had to consider whether to adopt the liberal construction of the term as made in Madhu Limayes case or to give a restricted construction to the said term so as to say that an order declining to discharge an accused in respect of offences tried as per the SCA is pure and simple an interlocutory order. The Honble Supreme Court, after having made a complete survey of the principles stated in Madhu Limayes case, the object of the SCA and the special features found in the Act, ultimately held that insofar as the offences tried as per the SCA are concerned, an order declining to discharge an accused is an interlocutory order against which no revision lies. Thus, the Honble Supreme Court gave a restricted meaning to the term "interlocutory order".

7. In V.R.Nedunchezhians case cited supra, the very same term "interlocutory order" as found in Section 19 (3) (c) of the PCA came to be considered by this