The President of the Village Panchayat is the Disciplinary Authority to pass suspension orders, and violation of principles of natural justice allows approaching the court under Article 226 without exhausting the appellate remedy.

A vacate stay petition has been filed and by consent of both the counsel, the main writ petition itself is taken up for final disposal.

2. The petitioner was appointed as a full time Panchayat Assistant on 1.12.1996. It is evident from the averments in the affidavit that there have been problems between the petitioner and the first respondent, who is the President. The petitioner has enclosed in the typed set of papers, various documents to show that the first respondent has not been discharging her duties as befitting the President. However, those letters or complaints are not germane for consideration in this writ petition. On 13.12.2007, the District Collector, Ariyalur passed an order of temporary suspension against the petitioner. Aggrieved by that, the petitioner filed the writ petition in W.P. No. 37611 of 2007. This writ petition was disposed of as follows:

“The prayer in the writ petition is to quash the order of suspension dated 13.12.2007 passed against the petitioner, who is a Panchayat Assistant. Admittedly, as per Section 106 of the Tamil Nadu Pachayats Act, 1994, the President of the Village Panchayat is the Disciplinary Authority to pass the order of suspension and to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the servants of the Village Panchayat. The District Collector, who has passed the impugned order has no jurisdiction to pass such order.

2. Hence, the writ petition is allowed on the ground that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to pass the Impugned order. While setting aside the impugned order, it is open to the fourth respondent to pass fresh orders, if it is warranted. Consequently, the connected MP is closed. No costs.”

Immediately, thereafter, the impugned order or temporary suspension was passed by the first respondent on 4.2.2008. Against that, the present writ petition has been filed.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner. submitted that the order passed is contrary to Section 106 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act and the approval of the council has not been obtained for the order of suspension and further as per the enclosure to G.O. Ms. No. 176, Rural Development and Local Administration Department, dated 1.12.2006 the petitioner is entitled for a hearing before he is placed under temporary suspension. The learned counsel also submitted that there is no basis for the allegation that the petitioner has abused or unnecessarily criticised the actions of the first respondent.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would submit that none of the allegations made against the first respondent or her husband have any basis. Further, it is also submitted that the petitioner, who relies on G.O. Ms. No. 176 Rural Development and Local Administration Department, dated 5.12.2006 is also bound by the appeal provision mentioned in the said Government Order and the petitioner ought to have filed an appeal before the Block Development Officer and against chat she has a right of second appeal before the District Collector.

5. This Court does not intend to go into the averments in the counter but to see whether the petitioner can be placed under temporary suspension without being given an opportunity, the relevant paragraph in G.O. Ms. No. 176, Rural Development and Local Administration Department., dated 5.12.2006 is as follows:

"Tamil"

6. Therefore, it la clear that it is open to the respondents to pass orders of censure, fine, stoppage of increment, stoppage of promotion, reduction of seniority, reduction in time scale, temporary suspension, and suspension for removal from service, but before doing so, the individual has to be given an opportunity of personal hearing for offering his explanation. This is obviously has not been done in the present case.

7. Valliappan, learned counsel for the first respondent is unable to say that the Government Order does not apply to the proceedings initiated against the petitioner. His only objection is that the petitioner ought to hav