Lessee held entitled to benefits of the provisions of the Act.

K. Veeraswami, J.

1. In the first of these appeals (S.A. No. 1153 of 1960), the 1st defendant is the appellant and in the other (S.A. No. 1171 of 1961) the plaintiffs, who brought the suit for evicting the 1st defendant from the land in question. It is common ground that the land originally belonged to Hajee Peer Batch a Sahib. The plaintiffs claim to be settlees under a settlement executed by him on 12th October, 1949. The lease in favour of the 1st defendant was executed by the original owner of the land on 22nd September, 1947 for a term of ten years at the rent stipulated in the document. The plaintiffs sought to evict the 1st defendant after the period of ten years. On behalf of the 1st defendant, various defences were taken which were, I think, rightly repelled by the Courts below. The 1st defendant questioned the status of the plaintiffs to bring the suit on the ground that under the settlement of the original owner of the land, the plaintiffs had only limited rights. The 1st defendant also contended that he had a superior right over the settlees on account of a varthamanam letter and a sale deed in his favour executed by Hajee Peer Batcha Sahib. As to the first point, the Courts below were of the view that the interpretation placed by the 1st defendant on the terms of the settlements was not correct. It seems to me that no exception can be taken to this view. The Courts below thought that the varthamanam letter relied on by the 1st defendant should be looked upon with suspicion and that so far as the sale deed was concerned, that was executed only after the settlement. Here again the Courts below were not wrong. During the pendency of the Second Appeal certain decisions of this Court were rendered under the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Second Appeal of the 1st defendant is mainly rested on a new ground taken on the basis of these decisions.

2. Though the point has been taken for the first time in the Second Appeal, inasmuch as it raised no new facts, I grant leave to the 1st defendant to raise it in this Court. The ground is that although the lease in 1947 in his favour was of a vacant site inasmuch as it contemplated putting up buildings by the 1st defendant on the vacant site, during the period of the lease and actually such buildings were put up. The building so put up became part of the vacant site and the vacant site should, therefore, be regarded as part of the buildings and that it followed from this that the lease become a lease of a building within the meaning of the Act. Learned Counsel for the 1st defendant appellant in support of this contention relies on Palaniappa Chettiar v. Vairavan Chettiar (1963) 1MLJ130 . There a Division Bench of this Court following and applying earlier cases held that though a lease originally was of a vacant site, nevertheless, the lessee, who had put up buildings on it and then got a renewal of the lease, was entitled to a protection under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act on the ground that the buildings as well as the land became an integral part of each other and that, therefore, the land which was originally leased was part of the buildings constructed on it. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents seeks to distinguish this case on the ground that in the instant case, there was no renewal of a lease. But it seems to me that on principle this distinction is without a difference. The principle of Palaniappa Chettiar v. Vairavan Chettiar (1963)1MLJ130 as I understand the Judgment, is that when a vacant site is leased out for putting up buildings thereon and buildings are actually put up on the land they become part of the land so that the land is also a part of the buildings with the result that the lease should be regarded as one of buildings, notwithstanding the fact that the buildings do not belong to the lessor. This principle, as it seems to me, does not depend on renewal of a lease, the essence of it bei