Ramamurti, J.

(1) This appeal arises out of a claim made before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The appellant's son, aged about 24 years, while going on a cycle from Elephant Gate to the Central Station met with an accident and was killed as a result of a lorry coming behind and hitting him and throwing him off the ground. This took place in the Walltax Road on 22-1-1962 at about 6-15 p.m. The first respondent is the owner of the lorry, the second respondent is the insurance company; the third respondent is the owner of a work-shop and a lorry repairer to whom the lorry has been entrusted for repairs by the first respondent at the time of the accident, while the 4th respondent is the person who drove the lorry which was involved in the accident.

(2) Respondents 1 and 2 contested the claim and respondents 3 and 4 remained ex parte. The Accidents Claims Tribunal found that the accident took place on account of the negligent way in which the lorry was driven by the 4th respondent, and that the appellant, the father of the deceased would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 8000 as compensation. The main defence of respondents 1 and 2 was that the first respondent was not liable inasmuch as he had entrusted the lorry to the 3rd respondent, an independent contractor for effecting certain repairs to the lorry that the 4th respondent had no licence, that the lorry was used by him unauthorisedly and without the permission of the third respondent, and that in any event, whatever may be the liability of the 3rd and the 4th respondents, respondents 1 and 2 could not be held vicariously liable for the negligent or careless action of the 4th respondent. Even though the Claims Tribunal found that there was no proof that the 4th respondent had no licence, it held that the relationship between the first and the 3rd and 4th respondents was not that of a master and servant but that of an independent contractor, and that no relief could be granted as against respondents 1 and 2. As it was conceded before the Tribunal that respondents 3 and 4 could not be made liable and were joined only as pro forma parties to the proceeding, no relief was granted even as against them and the claim was rejected. Hence the present appeal.

(3) We must at the outset state that we were unable to follow and appreciate a major portion of the argument of learned counsel for the appellant, as it was unintelligible, besides being opposed to well settled principles of law of torts on the question of vicarious liability. The substance of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the 3rd respondent would be clearly liable for the tortious act of the 4th respondent, and that even if the 3rd respondent should be held to be an independent contractor of the first respondent (not standing in the relationship of an agent or a servant of the first respondent) the act of the first respondent in entrusting the lorry to the 3rd respondent was by itself a dangerous and hazardous act, that a lorry is an inherently dangerous chattel and that by entrusting such a dangerous chattel to some other person that the first respondent cannot escape the liability for the consequences which would result if the lorry was taken out by any person whosoever it may be. According to learned counsel the entrustment of a lorry for repairs to a repairer is an act inherently dangerous, and that in the natural course of things the first respondent must anticipate such an injurious consequence, and that he was under an absolute liability to do everything and to prevent the lorry, being taken out and being exposed to such a risk. In substance his argument is that the first respondent cannot escape liability for the accident by proving that he had entrusted the lorry for repairs to some other contractor and that what he had done must be at his peril and he should have in any event foreseen some one in the workshop taking out the lorry. We have no