1970 Supreme(Mad) 121
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Ramamurthy, J.
S. Sethuraman
Vs.
Union of India (UOI), owning the Southern Railway, represented by its General Manager
Decided On: 13.03.1970
Time commences to run at the end of every month for the purpose of limitation in a suit for recovery of arrears of salary by a Government servant whose dismissal has been declared void.
Headnote:
LIMITATION ACT - ARTICLE 102 - WAGES - INCLUDES SALARY - TIME COMMENCES TO RUN AT THE END OF EVERY MONTH - ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF UNSETTLED ACCOUNT AND PART PAYMENT SAVES CLAIM FROM LIMITATION - PAYMENT MADE TOWARDS GENERAL CLAIM SAVES ENTIRE CLAIM - RAILWAY EMPLOYEE - DISMISSAL DECLARED VOID - ENTITLED TO FULL SALARY FOR ENTIRE PERIOD - RAILWAY'S ATTITUDE IN DELAYING SETTLEMENT AND RAISING UNCONSCIONABLE PLEAS DEPRECATED.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff, a ticket collector in the Southern Railway, was placed under suspension in February 1954 pending an enquiry into a charge of misconduct. He was dismissed from service in October 1954. The plaintiff challenged the dismissal order by filing a writ petition in the High Court, which was allowed in March 1959. The order of dismissal was confirmed on appeal in November 1959. The plaintiff reported to duty in March 1960 and was reinstated. He filed a suit in November 1962 to recover arrears of salary for the period from October 1954 to April 1960. The trial court decreed the suit, but the lower appellate court dismissed it on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
Finding of the Court:
The Supreme Court held that time would commence to run at the end of every month and that when the order of dismissal is set aside, the effect of the declaration is to hold the order of dismissal invalid as if it never existed and the public servant concerned was unlawfully prevented from rendering service. The Supreme Court held that the Government servant concerned will be entitled to arrears of salary only for a period of three years prior to the suit.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation? 2. Whether the payment of subsistence allowance and the admission of the existence of a subsisting account on the part of the railway amounted to acknowledgment of an unsettled account and a part payment towards account? 3. Whether the railway's attitude in delaying settlement and raising unconscionable pleas was deprecated?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that time would commence to run at the end of every month and that when the order of dismissal is set aside, the effect of the declaration is to hold the order of dismissal invalid as if it never existed and the public servant concerned was unlawfully prevented from rendering service. 2. The court held that the payment of subsistence allowance and the admission of the existence of a subsisting account on the part of the railway amounted to acknowledgment of an unsettled account and a part payment towards account. 3. The court deprecated the railway's attitude in delaying settlement and raising unconscionable pleas.
Final Decision: The court allowed the second appeal and decreed the plaintiff's suit with costs in all the Courts.
Ramamurthy, J.
1. The plaintiff who was an employee under the Southern Railway is the appellant is the second appeal. He filed the suit to recover a sum of Rs. 4,811-97 as representing the arrears of salary due to him after adjusting and giving credit for all the payments made. The trial court decreed the suit, but on appeal the lower appellate court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Hence the second appeal by the plaintiff. There is no dispute is any of the Courts that the amount claimed in the suit is payable except with regard to a sum of Rs. 80 towards Income Tax paid by the defendant on behalf of plaintiff and an adjustment of Rs. 579-8l in relation to the contribution to the Provident Fund Account of the plaintiff and the only point argued before me is the question of limitation.
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows. The plaintiff who was a ticket collector in the Egmore Railway Station was placed under suspension on 25th February, 1954 pending an enquiry into a charge of certain misconduct against him. On 3rd October, 1954 he was dismissed from service. The plaintiff took up the matter further by an appeal to the Chief Commercial Superintendent and a petition of mercy to the General Manager, but all without success. Then he filed a writ petition in the High Court which was allowed by order dated 20th March, 1959 quashing the order of dismissal. In Writ Appeal No. 114 of 1959 this order setting aside the dismissal was confirmed on 6th November, 1959. On 22nd March 1960, the plaintiff reported to duty; on 1st April, 1960 he was reinstated and on 3rd April, 1960 this Ticket Collector was posted to Bangarupet. The present suit was instituted on 8th November, 1962.
3. It is settled law that the word "wages" in Article 102, of the Limitation Act of 1908 includes salary. Till recently there was divergence of judicial opinion as to when time would commence to run under column 3 of Article 102, when an order of dismissal of a Government servant is declared void or set aside and he is reinstated in service. One view was that time would commence to run only when the order of dismissal is finally set aside or declared void on the reasoning that during that period when the matter was pending the Government servant could not fills a suit for recovery of arrears of salary. The other view was that the salary accrued due at the end of every mala fide the suit should be filed within tares years. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Jaichand Sawhney v. Union of India (1969) S.C. Weekly Rep. 957, it has been held that time would commence to run at the end of every month and that when the order of dismissal is set aside, the effect of the declaration is to hold the order of dismissal invalid as if it never existed and the public servant concerned was unlawfully prevented from rendering service. This Supreme Court held that the Government servant concerned will be entitled to arrears of salary only for a period of three years prior to the suit. The view of this Court reported in Slate of Madras v. A.V. Anantharaman (1963)IILLJ584Mad , was not accepted. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, it is no longer op in to argument that limitation would commence to run only when the final order setting aside the dismissal order is declared void or set aside:
4. In the course of the hearing, my attention was drawn to the various decisions in which the two divergent views aforesaid were expressed. But in none of the cases, the, effect of payment of subsistence allowance and the admission of the existence of subsisting account on the part of the railway was considered and no point was made as to how far that would amount to acknowledgment of an unsettled account and a part payment towards account. In the instant case, some payments have been made during the period of suspension and after the order of dismissal was set aside, the plaintiff was paid on 27th September, 1961 a sum of Rs