The judgment established the principle that the presumption under Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 is rebuttable and does not afford absolute immunity. It also clarified the scope of judicial review in cases involving legislative privilege.

1. The Associate Editor of a Tamil bi-weekly magazine by name "Nakkeeran" has come up with the above writ petitions challenging two notices issued by the Privileges Committee of the Tamil Nadu State Legislative Assembly.

2. I have heard Mr.P.T.Perumal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.S.Guru

Krishna Kumar, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Mr.S.Venkatesh, learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondent and and Mr.A.Navaneetha Krishnan, learned Advocate General appearing as amicus curie.

3. In the issue dated January 7-10, 2012 of the said Tamil bi-weekly magazine, an article was published at page No.5 as a cover story with the front wrapper giving an indication of the story line. In the same issue of the magazine, an article in the form of an interview with the former Deputy Chief Minister of the State also appeared.

4. A member of the State Legislative Assembly by name Professor Se.Ku.Tamizharasan submitted a letter dated 17.01.2012 to the Speaker of the Assembly, bringing these articles to his notice and requesting him to take action against the publications for breach of privilege of the Assembly. On the basis of the said letter of request, the Speaker referred the articles in question suo motu to the Privileges Committee.

5. Thereafter, the petitioner was served with two communications dated 20.01.2012, calling upon the petitioner to submit his explanations on or before 27.01.2012. While one communication related to the cover story that appeared at page 5, the other notice related to the interview given to the magazine by the former Deputy Chief Minister of the State.

6. Similar notices were also issued to the Editor of the magazine by name Mr.Gopal as well as to Mr.M.K.Stalin, who was the person interviewed. The petitioner and the editor of the magazine attempted to enter appearance through counsel on 27.01.2012 and sought three weeks time to respond. But, by a letter dated 28.01.2012, the respondent informed the petitioner that a vakalat of a counsel cannot be accepted and that the parties may have to either appear in person and give an explanation or submit a written reply. The petitioner was however granted time till 4-2-2012 to submit a reply.

7. Immediately upon receipt of the said communication, the petitioner came up with the above two writ petitions challenging both the notices. The writ petitions were admitted on 28.02.2012. Thereafter, the respondent has filed counter affidavits containing a brief indication of the facts that led to the initiation of proceedings and also the legal parameters on which the validity and maintainability of such writ petitions are to be tested. Therefore, the writ petitions were taken up for hearing.

8. Before I consider the rival contentions, let me take up the question of maintainability of the writ petitions. The question of maintainability revolves around the scope of judicial review. Therefore, let us see the same at the outset.

9. The march of law on the scope of judicial review of the exercise of legislative privilege, will be a matter of interest to a student of law, as the path was strewn with both roses and thorns. One of the earliest cases that came up before the Supreme Court in this regard, was the one in M.S.M.Sharma Vs. Shree Krishna Singha (AIR 1959 SC 395), which came to be known popularly as "Searchlight-I" case. In that case, the Editor of an English newspaper challenged before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of The Constitution, a notice of breach of privilege issued by the Secretary to the Bihar Legislative Assembly.

10. The primary contention raised in the said writ petition was that the proposed action by the Committee of Privileges was in violation of his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and to the protection of his personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. Another question raised was as to whether by virtue of Article 194(3) of The Constituti