The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of showing sufficient cause for delay in condonation cases, especially in the context of partition suits, and the need for a balanced approach that considers the impact on both parties involved.

ORDER

1. Animadverting upon the order dated 2.2.2012 passed by the III Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi in I.A.No.685 of 2010 in O.S.No.267 of 2004, this civil revision petition is filed.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner herein/defendant, who would echo the cri de coeur of his client to the effect that I.A.No.685 of 2010 in O.S.No.267 of 2004 was allowed condoning the huge delay of 1370 days in filing the application under Order IX Rule 9 of C.P.C.to get restored the suit, which was dismissed for default, at the trial stage. Counter was filed by the revision petitioner herein/defendant. After hearing both sides, the lower Court thought fit to condone the delay and accordingly, the delay was condoned, subject to payment of cost of Rs.2,620/-.

3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, this revision is focussed.

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/defendant would put forth and set forth his arguement to the effect that a plain reading of the order of the lower Court would show that the lower Court itself was not satisfied with the reasons found set out in the affidavit accompanying the delay petition and in such a case, no carte blanche was given to the lower Court Judge to simply condone the delay on payment of some cost.

5. The learned counsel also would cite the judgement of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 2011-3-L.W.26 – LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) by LRs. vs. STATE OF A.P. AND OTHERS and pyramid his arguement by pointing out that if the delays are casually condoned, then the very object of the Limitation Act would be set at naught.

6. I would like to fumigate my mind with the following precedents of the Honourable Apex Court:

(i) 2010 (2) Supreme 115 (Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another) and an excerpt from it would run thus:

"8. ............The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and other similar statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst.Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106. ..........................."

(ii) AIR 2002 SC 1201 (Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and aothers v. Gobardhan Sao and others) also could fruitfully be cited; certain excerpts from it would run thus:

"13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While cond