2012 Supreme(Mad) 2719
High Court of Judicature at Madras
P. JYOTHIMANI & M. DURAISWAMY
M/s. Sri Krishna Constructions rep. by its partner C. Vamsi Krishna
Versus
M/s. Tiffin's Barytes, Asbestos & Pains Ltd., Chennai
O.S.A. NO. 238 OF 2012
Decided On : 02-07-2012
For the Appellant:A.L. Somayaji, SC. for Narmadha Sampath, Advocate.
For the Respondent:G.R. Swaminathan for R. Thiagarajan, Advocates.
The Company Court has inherent powers to pass interim orders, including granting injunction, in addition to its jurisdiction to decide about the creditors' interest.
Headnote:
Injunction - Company Petition - Companies Act, 1956, Section 433[e], Section 494[1][a], Section 439[1][b] - Rule 9 of the Companies [Court] Rules, 1959
Fact of the Case:
The appellant filed a Company Petition against the respondent for winding up on the ground of inability to pay its debts. The appellant also filed an application seeking an order of injunction in respect of immovable and movable properties of the respondent. The Company Court vacated the order of injunction, which was later restored by a Division Bench.
Finding of the Court:
The Division Bench held that the Company Court has inherent powers to pass interim orders, including granting injunction, in addition to its jurisdiction to decide about the creditors' interest. The learned Judge's refusal to extend the order of injunction without assigning any reason was found to be improper and interfered with the right conferred by the Division Bench's order.
Issues: The issues revolved around the Company Court's jurisdiction to pass interim orders, the refusal to extend the order of injunction, and the proper exercise of discretion by the learned Judge.
Ratio Decidendi: The Company Court has inherent powers to pass interim orders, including granting injunction, in addition to its jurisdiction to decide about the creditors' interest. The refusal to extend the order of injunction without assigning any reason was improper and interfered with the right conferred by the Division Bench's order.
Final Decision: The impugned order passed by the learned Judge was set aside, and the order of injunction was restored. The learned Judge was requested to give priority to the Company Applications and decide the same after giving opportunity to both parties.
P. JYOTHIMANI, J.
1. Heard Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr.G.R.Swaminathan, learned counsel, who has taken notice on behalf of the respondent.
2. The original Company Petition has been filed by the appellant against the respondent Company for winding up on the ground of inability to pay its debts, under Section 433[e] r/w. Section 494[1][a] and 439[1][b] of the Companies Act, 1956. Pending the said Company Petition, the appellant filed Company Application No.1911 of 2010, seeking an order of injunction in respect of 'a' to 'e' schedule of immovable properties, from creating any third party interest and also not to make any sale of the movable properties, including minerals lying at the stockyard of the mines of the Company in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.
3. Originally, by order dated 20.12.2010, an order of injunction was granted in respect of all items of schedule 'a' to 'f' mentioned properties, and thereafter, by an order dated 7.1.2011, on an application filed by the respondent herein in C.A.No.23 of 2011 to vacate the said order of injunction, the injunction order was restricted only in respect of the other items, except schedule 'c' and 'f'. Subsequently, when the matter came up before the Company Court, the Company Court, by its order dated 14.3.2011, has vacated the order of injunction granted on 20.12.2010 on the ground that the Company Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order of injunction since its jurisdiction under the Companies Act is restricted only in respect of protecting the interest of the creditors. It was against the said order, O.S.A.No.164 of 2011 was preferred by the appellant and a Division Bench of this Court, by judgment dated 28.10.2011, relying upon Rule 9 of the Companies [Court] Rules, 1959 has categorically held that the Company Court, in addition to its jurisdiction to decide about the creditors' interest, etc., has inherent powers to pass any other interim order or direction, which included grant of interim injunction. Ultimately, the Division Bench, taking note of the fact that the learned single Judge has vacated the order of injunction without assigning any reason and also on the basis that it is not correct to hold that the Company Court has no inherent powers especially to grant injunction, while setting aside the said order passed by the learned Judge, has restored the earlier order of injunction and directed the learned Company Court Judge to decide the matter afresh by remitting the same. The operative portion of the judgment reads as under:
"10. In the above said circumstances, without assigning any reasons, the learned Single Judge has vacated the order dated 20.12.2010 which is not sustainable in law. Further more, it is pertinent to note here that the order dated 20.12.2010 has been modified on 7.1.2011 after hearing both sides. But, that order has not been challenged by either parties. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable, which is liable to be set aside. Hence, we are of the considered view that it is a fit case to set aside the order of the learned Single Judge, dated 14.3.2011 and restore the order dated 7.11.2011 and remit back the matter, to this Company Court to decide the matter afresh, after hearing the arguments for both parties."
4. After the matter was remanded, it appears that the matter was heard by a learned Judge for quite some time and ultimately on 30.3.2012, when the matter came up before the learned Judge, it is seen that the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, who was appearing for the applicant therein, has expressed her inability to proceed with the matter and therefore, she sought for an adjournment of the matter. Conceding her request, the learned Judge adjourned the matter after ten days, however, has not extended the interim order of injunction already granted. It is aggrieved by the said order of the learned Judge, the prese