2009 Supreme(Mad) 376
MADRAS HIGH COURT
F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, P. Muregesan, JJ.
Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. rep. by its Chairman and Managing Director, BHEL Corporate Office, New Delhi and Others
Versus
V. Pradeep Nalankilli and Another
Rev. Aplln. (MD) Nos. 79 and 36 to 42 of 2008 and M.P. (MD) Nos. 2 to 2 of 2008 in W.P. (MD) Nos. 687 of 2007, 9711, 9714, 7657 of 2006, 9639 of 2007, 9712, 9713 and 9715 of 2006
Decided on : 29th January, 2009.
Vijay Narayan Senior Counsel for K. Jayaraman, for Petitioners
V. Prakash, Senior Counsel for Ms. Lakshmi Gopinathan, G.R. Swaminathan, Senior Counsel for Ms. Lakshmi Gopinathan and B. Vijay Karthikeyan, Central Government Counsel, for Respondents
The main legal point established is that a review cannot re-appreciate evidence or reach a different conclusion, and the scope of review jurisdiction is limited.
Headnote:
Apprenticeship - Absorption of Artisan Trainees - Apprentices Act, 1961, Section 22 - Summary: The court discussed the applicability of Section 22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, and the interpretation of apprenticeship agreements in determining the entitlement of apprentices for regular appointment. The court highlighted the legal principles governing the scope of review and emphasized that a review cannot re-appreciate evidence or reach a different conclusion.
Fact of the Case:
The writ petitioners sought a writ of mandamus for regular appointment in various artisan posts after completing apprenticeship training under the Apprentices Act, 1961. The court found that the Division Bench and the learned single Judge directed the review petitioner company to appoint the writ petitioners based on the interpretation of Section 22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the review petitions lacked merit and dismissed them, emphasizing that a review cannot re-appreciate evidence or reach a different conclusion.
Issues: The issues involved the entitlement of apprentices for regular appointment under the Apprentices Act, 1961, and the scope of review jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that a review cannot re-appreciate evidence or reach a different conclusion, and highlighted the legal principles governing the scope of review.
Final Decision: The review petitions were dismissed with costs, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.
F.M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.
These review applications have been preferred in respect of the common judgment dated 14.5.2008, passed in W.A. (MD) Nos. 685 to 689 of 2007 and W.P. (MD) Nos. 7657, 9711 to 9715 of 2006 and 9639 of 2007. The writ appeals were filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 12.10.2007, passed in W.P. Nos. 8675 of 2006 etc. batch.
2. In all the writ petitions, the prayer was for the issuance of a writ of mandamus as against the review petitioner company for a direction to appoint the writ petitioners in the permanent regular service of the review petitioner company in the various artisan posts. The writ petitioners were all Apprentices in different trades and worked as such under the review petitioner company under the provisions of the Apprentices Act, 1961. When the review petitioner company issued a Notification in March, 2007 calling for applications to fill up various posts in its factory, the writ petitioners came forward with the writ petitions contending that they were all trained as Apprentices of the Review Petitioner Company and were issued with National Trade Certificate for having underwent apprenticeship training and therefore they were entitled for regular appointment in the vacancies which were notified for appointment.
3. The learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench by applying the provisions contained in Section 22 of the Apprentices Act, read along with paragraph 4.4 of the Recruitment Policy of the review petitioner's company held that absorption of artisan trainees in the various posts falling under skilled group A-III was inevitable and therefore in the absence of production of any of the contract of apprenticeship prohibiting such absorption by the review petitioner, it should be inferred that Section 22(2) alone would be applicable and consequently the writ petitioners were entitled for a direction as prayed for. The Division Bench therefore confirmed the order of the learned single Judge.
4. Reliance placed upon by the review petitioner on certain model Apprenticeship Contracts which were of the year 2007, which contains a clause that there was no obligation on the part of the employer to grant absorption was rejected by the Division Bench by holding that the said document came into existence only on 14.8.2008 and therefore, based on the said document the right of the writ petitioners cannot be rejected.
5. In these review petitions, the contention of the review petitioner company is that they were able to gather some of the contracts which pertains to the years 1978-2001 and also a circular of the review petitioner dated 30.7.1973, as well as another circular dated 6.7.1981, wherein, it was specified that the records relating to the training programs of the Apprentices were to be preserved only for a period of three years and that such contracts specifically contain a clause by which the Apprentices concerned agreed that there was no guarantee for regular employment after the successful period of Apprenticeship.
6. By referring to the above said documents, Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned senior counsel appearing for the review petitioner company in his submissions contended that those apprenticeship agreements were all copies which were available in the office of the Regional Directorate of Apprenticeship Training and which agreements relate to the Apprentices who underwent apprenticeship training in the review petitioner company. The learned senior counsel contended that though they related to various other apprentices other than the writ petitioners, since such apprenticeship agreements were all related to the contemporaneous period during which most of the writ petitioners underwent apprenticeship training, the various terms contained in those agreements can be taken as one which were applicable even to the writ petitioners. So contending, the learned senior counsel submitted that such apprenticeship agreements now placed before the Court contains a specific