The need for documentary or oral evidence to prove an agreement to sell, and the misapplication of legal principles by the first appellate Court in determining possession and applying the Doctrine of lis pendense.

Both the above second appeals are focussed as against the common Judgment and Decrees dated 28.09.2001 passed in A.S. Nos. 26 and 27 of 2001 by the Principal District Court, Kanyakumari District at Nagercoil in reversing the common Judgment and Decrees, dated 16.11.2000 passed in O.S.Nos.834 of 1991 and 884 of 1986 by the Additional District Munsif Court, Nagercoil.

2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status before the trial Court in O.S.No.884 of 1986.

3. The epitome and the edifice of the case of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.884 of 1986 (S.A.No.478 of 2002) which is a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, as stood exposited from the averments in the plaint could be portrayed and parodied thus: The first plaintiff and the first defendant entered into an agreement to sell whereby the latter agreed to sell in favour of the former an extent of 14 1/2 feet from east to west and 8 1/2 feet from south to noth, in S.No.1529-A, Nagercoil, for a sale consideration of Rs.1,250/- (Rupees One Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty only). In connection with the same, a sum of Rs.500/- was received by the first defendant from the first plaintiff on 13.12.1982 and a letter was executed by him and handed over the possession of the said property to the intended purchaser. However, the first defendant postponed the execution of sale deed under one pretext or the other. On 31.01.1986, the first defendant received a further sum of Rs.300/-from the first plaintiff and agreed to execute the sale deed within a short time. Despite the first plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part by paying the remaining sale consideration of Rs.450/-, the first defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed. The pre-suit notice dated 22.08.1986 from the first plaintiff to the first defendant evoked an untenable reply from the first defendant. Hence, the suit.

4. Per contra, a refutatory written statement was filed by the first defendant gainsaying and contradicting the averments/allegations in the plaint which could be parodied thus:

Being compelled by the excruciating circumstances created by the first plaintiff as against the first defendant, the latter submitted a petition to the police on 23.08.1982, whereupon the police suggested certain measures and as a concession, the first defendant agreed to sell an extent of 11 ft. 6 inches by 8 ft. 6 inches to the first plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.1,250/-on the condition that the sale consideration should be paid within a period of two months from 09.09.1982. On 13.12.1982, the first plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.500/- for which a receipt was given. Subsequently, Ex.A.4 the sale deed dated 11.08.1986 was executed wherein the suit property agreed to be sold was added as the second item. The property described in the schedule of the plaint is not the one intended to be sold by the first defendant in favour of the first plaintiff. Accordingly, he prayed for dismissal of the suit.

5. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants 2 and 3 (the wife and son of the first defendant) were added as parties. Balammal, the fourth defendant was also added as one of the parties who purchased the suit property situated to the north of the second item of Ex.A.4.

6. The defendants 2 and 3 filed the written statement setting out the pleas in support of the written statement filed by the first defendant. The first defendant sold out the suit property to the north of the second item in Ex.A.4 in favour of one Premkumar, s/o.Mrs. Chinammal, who in turn sold it to Balammal (D.4).

7. The fourth defendant - Balammal, filed the written statement to the effect that she purchased the suit property situated to the north of the second item of the property contemplated in Ex.A.4 from one Premkumar, s/o. Mrs. Chinammal and that she has been in possession and enjoyment of the said property. As such, the defendants 2 to 4 supported the case of th