The importance of showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay and the discretionary power of the court in granting or refusing the extension of time.

M. Venugopal, J.

1. The Appellant has preferred the present two Writ Appeals before this Court as against the order, dated 21.07.2010, made in W.P.Nos.32430 and 33304 of 2006 passed by the learned single Judge in allowing the Writ Petitions filed by the second Respondents.

2. The Learned single Judge, while passing the order dated 21.07.2010 in W.P.Nos.32430 and 33304 of 2006, has inter alia observed that, ".... the Petitioners have shown sufficient cause for condonation of delay and the first Respondent ought to have condoned the delay and allowed the parties to agitate the matter on merits" and consequently allowed the writ petitions by setting aside the order dated 21.03.2006 in TSE No. IA.17 of 2005 and TSE No. IA 18 of 2005. Further, the learned single Judge, after condoning the delay, has directed the first Respondent to number the appeals, issue notice to the second Respondent (Appellant herein) and decide the matter after hearing both the parties and pass orders on merits and in accordance with law.

3. Challenging the order, dated 21.07.2010, in W.P.Nos.32430 and 33304 of 2006, passed by the Learned single Judge, the Appellant/Management has focussed the instant two Writ Appeals contending that the impugned order suffers from wrongful exercise of jurisdiction vested on the Writ Court.

4. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Management strenuously submits that the Learned single Judge ought to have seen that the delay of 1186 days in preferring the appeals under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act is an enormous one and further no valid or acceptable reasons or any sufficient cause have been shown by the second Respondents/Writ Petitioners in W.P.Nos.32430 and 33304 of 2006 for condonation of delay in question.

5. Expatiating his contentions, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Management contends that the first Respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Chennai, has taken into account all relevant and attendant circumstances and only on appreciation of the entire gamut of the relevant facts, has thought it fit to dismiss the TSE No. IA.17 of 2005 and TSE No. IA 18 of 2005 on 21.03.2006, because of the reason that no sufficient cause for condoning the delay has been made out and therefore, the learned single Judge is not correct in interfering with the same under Writ Jurisdiction.

6. Yet another plea projected on behalf of the Appellant/Management is that the second Respondent (writ petitioners in W.P.Nos.32430 and 33304 of 2006) has clearly averred that since the criminal case against his relative, Koteeswaran, was completed only in the month of July, 2005 he was afraid to file a case against his dismissal order and before that, for the fear that the Management may rope in also in that case, he could not prefer the Appeal in time before the competent Forum. As such, the said reason assigned by the second Respondent is not an acceptable one because of the simple reason that the criminal case against Koteeswaran Writ Petitioner in W.P.No.33304 of 2006 was over in the month of July 2005 and he should have filed the appeal in November, 2005. In fact, according to the Appellant/Management, the second Respondent in W.P.No.32430 of 2006, Anandakumar, has not assigned sufficient or reasonable cause for the condonation of delay of 1186 days in issue.

7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Management strenuously takes a plea that the Learned single Judge has passed a common order in W.P.Nos.32430 and 33304 of 2006 as if the writ petitioner in W.P.No.32430 of 2006 (second Respondent in W.A.No.1996 of 2010) is also involved in the criminal case.

8. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant relies on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Jagdish Narain Maltiar vs. The State of Bihar and others [1973(1) LLJ 474], whereby and where-under, it is observed and laid down as follows:-

"The writ petition was filed against an order of removal from service. It was summarily dismissed on January 21, 1960