Articles of food cannot always be treated as unfit for human consumption.

The respondents herein, accused 1 and 2, respectively before the Court below, tried on a complaint filed by the Food Inspector, Trivandrum Circle (P.W.1) alleging that on 17th February, 1978 at about 2 p.m., when P.W.1 visited the shop belonging to the first accused, the second accused, salesman in the shop, sold 150 grams of peadhal which, on analysis, was found to be adulterated and that the accused thereby committed offences punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, hereinafter called the Act.

2. In denying their guilt, the accused contended that they purchased the pea dhal in question from the shop of Sri S. Pottivelu as per Exhibit D-1 cash bill and therefore they have not committed any offence as alleged.

3. There was no witness examined on the side of the accused.

4. The trial Court relying on a decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Subramonian1 acquitted the accused persons on the sole ground that there was no evidence either oral or documentary to show that the pea dhal purchased by P.W.1 was unfit for human consumption.

5. This order of acquittal is attacked by the learned Public Prosecutor who submitted that the trial Court has not properly understood the scope and effect of the decision referred to and relied on by it; that the Magistrate has seriously erred in not even looking into the charge framed by himself against the accused persons; that no charge has been framed against the accused persons under section 2(1)(a)(f) of the Act; that this is a case where standard has been prescribed for pea dhal under the Rules; that the Public Analyst has found that the sample did not conform to the standard prescribed and that therefore section 2(1)(a)(f) has no application to this case at all and the order of acquittal is clearly wrong and has to be set aside.

6. The learned Public Prosecutor is right in his submission that the decision referred to and relied on by the trial Court applied only to a case where the charge against the accused person was that he sold an article of food which was adulterated within the meaning of section 2(1)(f) of the Act. This decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present case. The report of the Public Analyst shows that the pea dhal purchased by P.W.1 from the second accused did not conform to the standard prescribed. Admittedly no charge under section 2(1)(f) of the Act has been framed against the accused persons in this case and pea dhal comes under the category of food grains for which a standard has been prescribed under the Rules framed under the Act. While construing and interpreting, sub-clause ( f) of section 2 (1) of the Act, in State of Kerala v. Subramonian1 this Court largely relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation v. Kacheroo Mal2 In a recent authoritative pronouncement, a different construction was put on sub-clause ( f) of section 2(1) by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia3 Distinguishing the decision in Kacheroo Mal's case5, it was held in the above case that on the plain language of the definition section, it is quite apparent that the words ‘or is otherwise unfit for human consumption’ are disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them and that the last clause ‘or is otherwise unfit for human consumption’ is residuary provision which would apply to a case not covered by or squarely falling within the clauses preceding it. In other words, the various clauses under subclause ( f) of section 2 (1) should be read disjunctively and the mere proof of the article of food being filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or insect-infested could be per se sufficient to bring the case within the meaning of adulterated as denned in sub-clause ( f) of section 2 (1) and it would not be necessary in such cases to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumption. Therefore at a trial on a charge under section 2(1)(f