The main legal principle established is the recognition of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a valid ground for divorce, despite procedural technicalities, emphasizing the impracticality of expecting reconciliation after a prolonged period of marital discord.

1. The present civil miscellaneous second appeal is directed against the concurrent findings of both the Courts below, refusing to grant a decree for dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent.

2. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the appeal are given as under:

A brother and sister decided to solemnize the marriage of their own children, that is the appellant’s father being the real brother of the respondent’s mother solemnized the marriage between the appellant and the respondent on 29.10.1987 at Nagal Nagar, Dindigul and soon after the marriage, the husband and wife resided at SPIC Nagar, Tuticorin only for about three months. The respondent left for her parental home at Dindigul and after sometime, even though the respondent returned to the matrimonial home, she left the matrimonial home again and reached her parental home for delivery in the month of August, 1988 and a child was also born. Thereafter, the respondent-wife did not come forward to restore the matrimonial life with the appellant-husband. Even though many attempts were made to restore the matrimonial life between the husband and wife after the birth of the child, it was pleaded, all the efforts went in vain and in this process two years had gone by. It was again pleaded that a legal notice dated 6.10.1989 was sent by the respondent-wife to the appellant stating that the appellant’s parents must given an assurance letter, failing which she would not restore the matrimonial life with the appellant. A reply notice dated 16.10.1989 was sent denying the allegations and to restore the matrimonial life, but there was no response. Again on 22.10.1989 the appellant sent another notice to the respondent. A reply notice was sent by the respondent with various allegations. In the meanwhile, the respondent filed a petition in H.M.O.P. No. 4 of 1992 for restitution of conjugal rights and in the said petition, the appellant made an endorsement promising to restore the matrimonial life. In spite of the said endorsement, it was pleaded that the respondent was adamant to get an assurance letter from her in-laws and that she would not restore the matrimonial life till then. Again on 31.12.93, a legal notice was sent by the respondent, during the pendency of the H.M.O.P. No. 4 of 1992, stating that if the appellant failed to give the assurance, she would file an application for judicial separation. When the matter did not reach an amicable atmosphere for restoration of conjugal rights, the appellant finally sent a notice on 14.10.94 to the respondent to restore the matrimonial life based on the orders passed in H.M.O.P. No. 4 of 1992. One another letter was also addressed through the counsel to advise her to restore the matrimonial life with the appellant. In the meanwhile, the respondent also filed a suit for maintenance and the same was also decreed.

3. It was further pleaded that in spite of all these efforts, when the matrimonial life was not restored by the respondent, the appellant filed a petition for divorce before the learned Principal Sub Judge, Dindigul in H.M.O.P. No. 18 of 1996, 13 years after the marriage on account of the disturbed matrimonial life, but the said petition was dismissed for non-prosecution by order dated 19.10.2000. After the dismissal of the petition for divorce, the appellant once again filed a fresh petition in H.M.O.P. No. 42 of 2004 seeking for dissolution of marriage, again after four years. The trial Court dismissed the said petition by order dated 12.11.2008 on the ground that the appellant neither restored the earlier petition for divorce in H.M.O.P. No. 18 of 1996, which was dismissed for non-prosecution on 19.10.2000, nor preferred any appeal as against the decree for maintenance passed in the suit. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the second petition for divorce, the appellant preferred an appeal in H.M.C.M.A. No. 6 of 2009 before the first appellate Court. But the said appeal was also dismissed.