The main legal point established is that the authority under the Permanent Status Act does not have the power to adjudicate on the genuineness of the contract or the employment status of the laborers.

1. The petitioner is a Company known as, "Madras Aluminium Company Limited". It is having its factory at Mettur Dam, where it manufactures Aluminium Ingot, Aluminium Wire Rods and Buss Bar. It is a factory registered under the Factories Act. According to the petitioner, under Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, there was no order issued prohibiting employment of contract labour in the petitioner Establishment. Therefore, according to the petitioner, it had entered into a contract with a contractor, through whom the contract labours were engaged for maintenance of sanitary facilities in the factory, guest house and employees' quarters. According to the petitioner, these works do not require employment of direct workmen for full shift hours. Thus, according to the petitioner, the respondents 2 to 6 herein were all employed only as contract labours and not directly employed by the petitioner.

2. While so, according to the petitioner, claiming themselves to be directly employed under the petitioner and also claiming that as per Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act 1981, they have already acquired a permanent status, the respondents 2 to 6 made an application to the competent authority under the said Act, viz., the first respondent herein, for an appropriate order to direct the petitioner Establishment to grant permanent status to the respondents 2 to 6.

3. The first respondent herein, after holding necessary enquiry, by order in N.E. 10287/2002, dated 04.01.2005, found that the respondents 2 to 6 were directly employed by the petitioner Establishment and therefore, they are entitled for permanent status and accordingly, it had issued an order directing the petitioner to confer permanent status for the respondents 2 to 6 herein. Aggrieved over the same, the petitioner has come up before this Court with this Writ Petition.

4. I have heard Mr.V.Karthic, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Mr.R.Rajeswaran, the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent; and Mr.S.Vaidyanathan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 6. I have also perused the records carefully.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that it is not within the competence and jurisdiction of the authority under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act 1981 (hereinafter referred to as "Permanent Status Act"), to examine the question as to whether the contract entered into between the petitioner Establishment and the contractor is sham and nominal or the same is genuine. The learned counsel would further submit that if it is found that the respondents 2 to 6 are only contract labours and that the contract is genuine, then they are not entitled for the benefits of the Permanent Status Act, since, the Permanent Status Act is not applicable to contract labours. The learned counsel would further add that the power of the authority under Section 5 of Permanent Status Act and Rule 6(4) of Permanent Status Rule is very limited and he has got no authority to adjudicate upon the disputed facts as to whether the contract is sham and nominal or genuine and whether the workmen are directly employed by the petitioner or they are only contract labours. The learned counsel would further contend that the power of the authority is very limited only to examine the records including Form-1 as per the Rule, to take evidence in a summary manner and to find out whether the workman concerned had completed 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months in an Establishment and issue appropriate direction. Beyond that, according to the petitioner, the first respondent/competent authority does not have any more power to go into the above complicated questions, which could be resolved only by the adjudicatory authority under the Industrial Disputes Act. In this regard, the