The judgment established the importance of clear proof of adverse possession, the impact of Islamic Law on property division, and the application of limitation provisions in partition suits.

1. This second appeal is focused by the defendants, inveighing the judgement and decree dated 30.11.2000 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore in A.S.No.225 of 1999 in reversing the judgment and decree dated 20.07.1999 passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore in O.S.No.633 of 1996.

2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.

3. A summation and summarisation of the germane facts, absolutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus:

a] The plaintiffs, six in number, filed the suit seeking the following reliefs:

- to pass the judgment and decree as against the defendants

- directing the division of the suit properties into five equal shares by metes and bounds and allot one such share to the plaintiffs jointly by appointing a Commissioner;

- directing the defendants to pay the costs of the suit.

(extracted as such)

setting out the facts, which could tersely and briefly, in a few broad strokes could be set out thus:

The property described in the schedule of the plaint was purchased by one T.A .Assan Kader Rowther and his four sons, viz., defendants 1 to 3 and the deceased Abdul Jabbar vide document No.2764 of 1956 registered in the office of the SRO, Coimbatore. The suit properties are agricultural lands, which were in joint possession and enjoyment of them. The defendants' were managing the said properties after the death of the plaintiffs' father Abdul Jabbar. In fact, plaintiffs' were minors at the time of the death of their father. Taking undue advantage of the same, the defendants neglected the plaintiffs' right over the suit property and failed to allot their aliquot shares. The plaintiffs' claim 1/5 th share in the said entire property purchased jointly.

Accordingly, they prayed for partition.

(b) Per contra, the defendants' filed the written statement jointly, resisting the suit, the warp and woof of the same would run thus:

The said T.A. Assan Kader Rowther bequeathed in favour of the plaintiffs', land and building measuring an extent of 2424 sq.ft. (24 x 101) bearing Door No.19/113 and T.S.No.2/1196 belonging to these defendants vide settlement deed dated 01.06.1965 and Document No.2537 of 1965. Absolutely, there is no cause of action for filing the suit. The defendants' were not cultivating any land on behalf of the defendants' and thatthey never attempted to deprive anyone's property much less the plaintiffs' property.

Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit.

c] Whereupon issues were framed by the trial court.

d] Up went the trial, during which, on the plaintiffs' side, the fourth plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A1 to A3. O n the defendants' side, D3 examined himself as DW1 and marked Exs.B1 to B5.

e] Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the suit; as against which, the plaintiffs' preferred the appeal. Whereupon, the first appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the suit in toto.

f] Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, the defendants' have preferred this second appeal on various grounds and also suggesting the substantial questions of law.

4. My learned predecessor framed the following substantial questions of law:

1. When the plaintiffs are aware of execution of release deed by their mother under Ex.B4 and their long inaction coupled with the knowledge on their part about open and notorious exercise of the rights and enjoyment by the defendants whether the same would not amount to ouster and whether the lower appellate court has not erred in law in holding that there is no ouster?

2. When the plaintiffs had acquired another property executed by appellants and their father in favour of the plaintiffs on the same day i.e. on 1.6.1995 when the plaintiffs mother executed release deed and whether under s