The main legal point established in the judgment is that a suit to declare a compromise decree null and void is not maintainable if the suit was dismissed on the basis of the compromise memo, as per Order 23, Rule 3A.

1. The plaintiffs 2 to 8 in O.S.No.492 of 1996, on the file of the Principal District Munsif Court, Chidambaram, are the appellants herein. They filed the suit for declaration that the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Chidambaram, as null and void, not executable and not binding on the plaintiffs, for consequential injunction, restraining the defendants 1 and 2 from evicting the plaintiffs from the suit property, in any manner, and for mandatory injunction, directing the defendants to restore the electricity service connection to the plaintiffs' premises.

2. The Trial Court, in and by its judgment, dated 21.03.2006, dismissed the Suit. The Lower Appellate Court also confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, this Second Appeal is filed.

3. The case of the plaintiffs, as stated in the plaint, in short, is that the suit property belonged to one Ambalathadi. The plaintiffs are living in the suit property as tenants. The deceased first plaintiff entered into an oral agreement with one Appasamy Iyer, son of Vaithiyalingam, born through his first wife. As per that agreement, the first plaintiff was allotted a vacant site, bearing Door No.12/2, having an extent of 55 feet in length, and, 35 feet in breadth, to build a house. The first plaintiff put up a thatched house, having an extent of 35 x 25 feet. The suit property was maintained by Vaidiyalingam, on behalf of Ambalathadi. The plaintiffs have further stated that the defendants 1 and 2 herein filed O.S.No.56 of 1996 for mandatory injunction to disconnect the electricity service connection to the suit premises, and even before the service of summons on the first plaintiff herein, who was the fourth defendant in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the defendants 1 and 2 herein approached the first plaintiff herein and assured him that they would make arrangements for restoration of electricity, provided, the first plaintiff should sign certain blank papers. Reposing faith on their words, the first plaintiff also signed the blank papers and that was misused by the defendants in the suit, as if, the parties have entered into a compromise, by which, the first plaintiff herein has agreed to vacate the suit premises, on or before January, 1997 and the suit in O.S.No.56 of 1996 was dismissed on the basis of the compromise memo filed by the parties and taking advantage of the compromise memo filed in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the defendants 1 and 2 herein are attempting to evict the plaintiffs by force and they also disconnected the electricity connection to the plaintiffs' premises with the help of other defendants. According to the plaintiffs, the compromise memo was not executed in accordance with the provisions of law and the parties have never appeared before the Court and the plaintiffs were not aware of the compromise memo, and therefore, the suit was filed for declaration that the decree passed in O.S.No.56 of 1996 as null and void, not executable and not binding on the plaintiffs, as stated above.

4. The defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement, stating that in O.S.No.56 of 1996, the present first plaintiff was the fourth defendant and he remained ex parte. Later, he filed an application to set aside the ex parte decree passed against him, stating that the matter was compromised. The first plaintiff along with the defendants 1 and 2 filed a joint memo before the Court in O.S.No.56 of 1996 and on the basis of the compromise memo filed by the parties, the suit was dismissed. As per the compromise memo, the first plaintiff is bound to vacate the premises by the end of January, 1997 and to avoid the same, he has filed the present suit.

Therefore, the suit is not maintainable. Moreover, if there is any failure on the part of the first plaintiff to vacate the suit premises by the end of January, 1997, the defendants 1 and 2 herein are at liberty to initiate proceedings against the first plaintiff for r