Decision of Tribunal amounts to error rendering decision liable to be quashed.

Rajamannar, J.

Three points were pressed upon us by Mr. E. Venkatesam, learned Counsel for the appellant in this case. The appeal is against the Judgment of Rajagopalan, J., confirming the order of the Railway Rates Tribunal on a complaint made by the appellant-company engaged in the manufacture of jute goods. The first point is that though the Tribunal held that it would be fair and reasonable that there should be a concessional rate, namely 12½ per cent. less than the standard rate for haulage over 500 miles, the Tribunal did not give effect to this concession with effect from the date of the complaint. The Tribunal dealt with this question and in the exercise of its discretion held that there were no circumstances which would justify the grant of that concession from the date of the complaint and that it would be sufficient if the concession should be operative from the date of the order of the Tribunal. It is obvious that though the Tribunal may have jurisdiction to grant relief from the date of the complaint, as was held by this Court in Southern Railway v. The Railway Rates Tribunal (1956) 1 MLJ 395, there is nothing which compels the Tribunal to grant relief from that date. It is certainly within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant relief from a date subsequent to the date of the complaint. Mr. Venkatesam urged that assuming that the Tribunal had such discretion, it should be exercised judicially and not in an arbitrary manner. But in this case we are convinced that the discretion has been exercised after consideration of relevant matters. It is not for us to say how we would have exercised our discretion. We agree with Rajagopalan, J., that there is nothing ex facie in the order of the Tribunal to hold that the discretion of the Tribunal has been improperly exercised.

The second point is based on Article 14 of the Constitution. There was an enhancement in the rate for jute by re-classification. Jute which was originally in class 2 was placed in classes 7 and 8 in the areas served by all railways except the E.B. and A.B. railways. As regards other commodities, there was only one stepup, that is, goods placed in class 2 were placed in class 3. This differentiation, it was contended, amounted to a discrimination which offended the principle of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Tribunal however has given reasons to justify the re-classification. We cannot say that having regard to the peculiar circumstances relating to the transport of raw jute the re-classification was discriminatory in any sense. There was good reason for re-classifying raw jute as coming within classes 7 and 8. The learned Judge Rajagopalan, J., no doubt does not in terms mention Article 14. All that he says is that there was ample material on the evidence before the Tribunal for its conclusion that the change in the classification was not in reasonable. We have examined the charge levelled by the appellant but we are convinced that there was no discrimination which should be struck down by applying the principle of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The third and last point was that Issue No. 1 should have been decided by the Tribunal. That issue runs thus:

“Were the increases in the station-to-station rates for the carriage of jute to the applicant mills and their final cancellation justified and reasonable.”

The matter covered by this issue related to a period anterior to the filing of the complaint. Actually oft the date of the complaint there were no station-to-station rates. There was an issue whether the appellant was entitled to any and to what special station-to-station rates. But that was decided against the appellant. It was unnecessary for disposing of the complaint to decide the question whether the periodical increases in station-to-station rates when they existed were justified and reasonable. Admittedly the Tribunal could not have ordered a refund or given any other substantial relief to the appellant even if they were to come to t