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1962 Supreme(Mad) 290

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MYSORE AT BANGALORE
Mr. Justice T. K. Tukol, J.
Madiah
Versus
The State of Mysore
Criminal Revision Petition No. 356 of 1962
Decided on: 25th September, 1962

Advocates Appeared:
C. B. Srinivasa Rau, Advocate for petitioner.
The Government Pleader for respondent.

Review of the order of dismissing revision petition for default.

Headnote:Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898—Section 561-A — Inherent power of High Court in the matter of review of the order of dismissal passed of revision petition dismissed for default.

Order.-

This is a petition for setting aside the order of dismissal of Criminal Revision Petition No. 337 of 1962, passed by this Court on 4th September, 1962. When that petition had been fixed for hearing on the aforesaid date, the Advocate for the petitioner was absent and he had not complied with the objections raised by the Office with regard to the deficit Court-fee. The application was accordingly rejected on the ground that the Advocate was absent and that there was no compliance with the objections.

In the present petition, the learned Government Pleader has raised an objection that this Court has no power to review the former order of dismissal and that under the Rules framed by this High Court, the matter should go before a Division Bench. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961 (Mysore Act V of 1962), and contended that in view of the fact that clause (v) of section 10 expressly reserves “all other matters not expressly provided for in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force” to a Bench of two Judges, this Court constituted of a single Judge, would not have the power to set aside the order of dismissal. In my opinion, the plain meaning of the clause referred to is that if there is any other law for the time being in force which empowers a single Judge to pass an order, then clause (v) of section 10 would not be an impediment. It must be conceded that section 9 which deals with the power of a single Judge does not make any express provision on this subject. Rule 4 of the Rules framed by the High Court in 1959 and saved by the subsequent amendments lays down that every petition or application for review or reconsideration or correction of judgment, decree, order or sentence, shall be posted before the original Bench which pronounced, made or passed such judgment decree or sentence. It therefore follows from this rule, that a single Judge who passed the order of dismissal is competent to re-consider that order or review that order and pass a suitable order in the matter. The words “ any other law for the time being in force” occurring in clause (v) of section 10, would necessarily cover the statutory rules framed by the High Court which have the same force as the provisions of an enactment. Judged in this light, I have no doubt in holding that this Court is competent to review or re-consider the order of dismissal passed by it.

The High Court Rule is silent about the scope of this power of review or reconsideration. In this connection reference may be made to sections 369 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which throw light on the point at issue. section 369 reads thus:

“Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or ‘in the case of a High Court by the Letters Patent or other instrument constituting such High Court’, no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error.”

This section lays down that subject to the other provisions contained in the Code, every judgment or order passed on merits by the High Court is final and shall not be altered or reviewed except for the purpose of correcting clerical errors. The High Court Act and the Rules framed thereunder do not enlarge the power of reviews. So far as section 561-A is concerned, it lays down:

” Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

This section came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in T.H. Hussain v. M.P. Mondkar1 where the legality of an order cancelling bail by a Bench of this High Court in exercise of the power under this section was challenged. Their Lordships held that under section 561-A, the High Court had inherent













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