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1962 Supreme(Mad) 156

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Smt. Justice Anna Chandy, J.
Abdul Hameed Khan
Versus
Muhammed Haneefa
Crl. A. No. 394, of 1961
Decided on: 28th May, 1962

Advocates Appeared:
T.K. Narayana Pillai, for Appellant.
K. Velayudhan Nair, V.S. Moothathu, K.J. Joseph, M.C. Sen, T.K.M. Unnithan, C.R. Balakrishna Panicker and P. Balakrishna Kurup, for Respondent 1.State Prosecutor for the State.

Sale to Food Inspector for analysis.

Headnote:Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954— Section 2 (xiii) — Sale —Meaning of —Sale for analysis to Food Inspector amounts to sale.

JUDGMENT

This is an appeal against an order of acquittal. The case of the complainant, the Food Inspector of the Quilon Municipality, was that the accused a shop-keeper sold him adulterated tea. On 7th September, 1960, the complainant purchased three-fourths of a pound of tea dust from out of the stock of 65 pounds which was exposed for sale in the accused's shop. The complainant paid the price of Re.1.31 nP. to the accused who received it and issued a cash bill signed by him in favour of the complainant. Notice of the intention to have the tea analysed was given to the accused then and there and he accepted it. One part of the sample taken was delivered to the accused and he acknowledged receipt of it. A mahazar was drawn up giving the details about the sale, the sampling and the delivery of the sample to the vendee and that record was also signed by the vendor. The report of the Public Analyst showed that the tea was adulterated as the sample contained 10% extraneous matter consisting of a mixture of gram husk and coffee husk. The accused admitted having sold three-fourth pound of tea to the Food Inspector. He also admitted having issued the cash bill and signed the mahazar and the intimation. However he denied having accepted the price for the tea and added that he was induced to sign the cash bill, the mahazar and the intimation form by the Food Inspector under threat of criminal prosecution.

The learned Magistrate held that there was no sale of the tea to the complainant as the sale was effected with the knowledge that the buyer was the Food Inspector. The mahazar was eschewed from evidence on the ground that it offended Article 20(3) of the Constitution against compulsory self-incrimination. The Analyst's certificate was not acted upon since the learned Magistrate was of the view that in the absence of evidence to establish that gram husk and coffee husk were injurious to health the tea that was sold cannot be deemed adulterated The correctness of all these findings is challenged in appeal.

The finding that the sale effected to the Food Inspector is not a sale coming within the purview of the Food Adulteration Act is clearly unsustainable. The evidence in the case has established that the tea was exposed for sale in the shop and was purchased by the Food Inspector on payment of money. The accused himself does not dispute that the tea was exposed for sale or that he sold three-fourth pound of tea out of that stock to the Food Inspector. He only denies having received any money for it. However in view of Exhibit F-2 the cash bill given by the accused, his story that no money was paid, seems to be only an after-thought. The decision reported in Food Inspector v. Parameswaram Chettiar1relied on by the learned Magistrate is not applicable to the facts of this case. A subsequent decision of this Court reported in Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality v. Syed Abdul Kasim2has taken the view that a voluntary sale of an article for money is a ‘sale’ under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act even though the vendor is a Food Inspector and the article sold is meant for purposes of analysis.

The view taken by the Magistrate that the taking of the signature of the accused to the mahazar offends Article 20(3) of the Constitution is also erroneous, Apart from the fact that there is nothing except the mere ipse dixit of the accused that any compulsion was involved in taking his signature to the record, to bring a statement within the prohibition of Article 20(3) :

“The person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement and it is not enough that he should become an accused any time after the statement has been made”-Vide State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu3.

In this case the vendor had not assumed the character of an accused at the time the tea was purchased or sampled by the Food Inspector. He came toassume the position much later when the food was actually found to be adulterated on analysis and







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