A subsequent purchaser is a necessary and proper party to a suit, and the decision to implead them should be based on the facts of each case.

1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed to set aside the fair and decretal order, dated 11.02.2010, passed in I.A.No.243 of 2009 in O.S.No.564 of 2005, by the learned II Additional District Munsif, Nagercoil.

2. The petitioner is the proposed third party. The first respondent filed the suit in O.S.No.564 of 2005 against the second respondent, for permanent injunction restraining him from blocking or obstructing the plaint schedule property at any place.

3. According to the second respondent, the pathway is a private pathway, not a public pathway. Pending suit, a portion of the property was purchased by the petitioner's Principal on 10.11.2008. After such purchase, the petitioner filed I.A.No.243 of 2009, to implead him as third defendant in the suit. The first respondent/plaintiff resisted the said application.

4. The learned Judge after considering all the materials on record, dismissed the said application on the ground that the petitioner's principal purchased the property during pendency of the suit. The petitioner's principal knowing fully well about the pendency of litigation, purchased the said property. Against the said order, the present civil revision petition is filed.

5. Heard Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Mr.S.Subbiah, learned counsel for the first respondent.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the third respondent also the subsequent purchaser and she was impleaded as the second defendant, by the order, dated 28.11.2006, made in I.A.No.1065 of 2006. He also argued that the petitioner is also similarly placed person like the third respondent and the learned Judge ought to have allowed the application.

7. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following Judgments:-

(i) 2005 (4) CTC 47 [Amit Kumar Shaw and Another Vs. Farida Khatoon and Another];

(ii) 2013 (2) CTC 104 [Thomson Press (India) Ltd., Vs. Nanak Builders & Investors P. Ltd. & Others; and

(iii) 2014 (3) LW 769 [V.L.Dhandapani Vs. Revathy Ramachandran & Others]

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed much reliance on the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 2014 (3) LW 769 [V.L.Dhandapani Vs. Revathy Ramachandran & Others], wherein in paragraph Nos.11 to 16, it has been held as follows:-

"11. The issue required to be answered by us has already been dealt with in extenso by the decision of the Supreme Court in THOMSON PRESS (INDIA) LIMITED V. NANAK BUILDERS AND INVESTORS PRIVATE LIMITED AND OTHERS (2013) 5 Supreme Court Cases 397. Therefore we are of the view that the reference as sought for by the learned single Judge is no longer required to be answered. However, as the cases are pending for quite some time and arguments have been made before us on merits, we would like to pass final orders instead of requesting the learned single Judge to decide them. This we do so also for the reason that there is no intra Court Appeal or Revision against the order of the learned single Judge. Therefore, the parties also would not lose any right to approach the Forum before this Court.

12. In the decision referred supra, the Supreme Court has considered the scope of both Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as well as the Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the said case, the suit was filed for specific performance. Inspite of the prohibitory orders passed, there was an alienation by a party to the suit. Even though the purchaser could not be termed as a bona fide purchaser, the Supreme Court, after considering the scope and ambit of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allowed the application for impleadment sought for.

13. Considering the scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, after considering all the earlier judgments, it has been held that doctrine of lis pendens does not inde