The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, particularly Section 15(2) of both acts, were interpreted to determine the inheritance rights and claims to family property, influencing the court's decision to dismiss the quash petition.

1. Petitioner seeks quash of proceedings in Crime number 658 of 2012 on the file of the first respondent.

2. The second respondent is the defacto complainant. In his complaint dated 26.04.2012, the second respondent has informed of the petitioner, one another and himself being the sons of Venkatachalam Chettiar and of their having a sister by name Alagammai. He has informed of the petitioner having been given in adoption to a paternal uncle and the petitioner having married his sister's daughter, who was unwell. He has stated that the petitioner coerced his father into executing a Will in the year 1979 behind the back of the family members and of a compromise entered into whereunder the petitioner was put in charge of properties towards avoiding litigation and in the hope that the petitioner and his adoptive father amicably and expeditiously would divide the properties within a year. The second respondent complains of the petitioner's failure to do so over a period of 25 years, of his not having given any account of the administration of the estate nor the details of sale of properties and of various letters having evoked no response. Informing breach of trust and misappropriation by the petitioner, the second respondent has termed a grave crime the withholding of his wife's as also the family jewellery and expressed apprehension that the petitioner might have sold the jewellery and silver articles and misappropriated moneys. He further has informed of the petitioner wrongfully having fabricated records. He has stated that the petitioner holds a Malaysian identity number, was in India and was likely to leave the country to avoid discharge of his liabilities.

3. Heard learned counsel for petitioner, learned counsel for second respondent and learned Additional public prosecutor as also perused the papers, particularly the petition of the impleading petitioners.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner would seek to justify the quash petition submitting thus: the petitioner is the administrator of the Estate of late Venkatachalam Chettiar, at Malaysia, he having been appointed as such under consent decree passed in Proceeding No.224 of 1985 on the file of High Court, Penang, dated 24.08.1992. The second respondent has moved an action in O.S.No.170 of 201 on the file of learned Subordinate Judge, Devakottai, seeking the following relief:

'to declare that the alleged Will alleged to have been executed by Alamelu Achi on 17.01.1986 and registered on 27.03.1986 is null and void.'

The petitioner was precluded from distributing the assets owing to an order of passed by this Court in O.A.No.309 of 2011 and A.No.1791 of 2011 in C.S.No.213 of 2011 on 25.03.2011. The second respondent would have to work out his rights in civil law.

Alamelu Achi, the paternal aunt of the petitioner and the second respondent had been abandoned by her husband and lived with her brother Swaminathan Chettiar, the adoptive father of the petitioner. She had left behind a Will bequeathing all her jewels and other movables to the two daughters of the petitioner. Chellammal, wife of the second respondent and daughter of Alamelu Achi, had died issueless. By virtue of section 15 (2) of the Hindu succession act, the second respondent could not raise any claim to property which would have been inherited by his wife. Even otherwise, the second respondent had moved a civil action in O.S.No.170 of 2011 on the file of Sub Court, Devakottai, against the petitioner and the beneficiaries under the registered Will dated 17.01.1986. He would have to work out his remedy in such action.

5. Apart from the above two primary contentions, learned counsel has submitted that the complaint against the petitioner was an abuse of process, that the petitioner's entry into India wrongfully was being obstructed by resort to the present complaint and that a letter submitted by the petitioner to the first respondent informing that he would cause due distribution of assets was one writte