The main legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for the trial court to consider the evidence and render a proper decision in accordance with the law.

1. The Appellants have preferred the instant Criminal Appeal as against the order dated 18.01.2011 in Cr.M.P.No.1690 of 2010 in Crl.M.P.No.450 of 2010 passed by the Learned Principal Sessions Judge, Erode.

2. The Learned Principal Sessions Judge, Erode, while passing the impugned order, on 18.01.2011, in Cr.M.P.No.1690 of 2010 in Crl.M.P.No.450 of 2010 (filed by the Respondent/Petitioner/Third Party), had, among other things, in paragraph 10, observed that '.... From the above said documents, it reveals that the property which is given as security belongs to the Petitioner and the value of the same is Rs.1,29,00,000/-. The amount which was attached by this court under Section 4 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1944 is Rs.86,93,500/-. So, the security offered by the petitioner is more than the amount attached by this Court. She also undertakes to redeposit the amount whenever ordered by this Court. So, this Court is satisfied with the security offered by the petitioner in lieu of the attachment as per Section 8 of the said Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1944 and accept the security to raise the order of attachment with regard to the deposit of amount in Indian Bank, Erode' and resultantly, allowed the Petition by raising the attachment made over the deposit in Indian Bank, Erode to the tune of Rs.86,93,500/- subject to the condition that the Petitioner executing a registered security bond with regard to the property to be offered as security within 10 days from today in the office of the concerned Registrar in favour of the 1st Respondent (1st Appellant) and further, the Respondent/Petitioner was directed to produce the document into Court within one month.

3. According to the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants/Respondents, the impugned order passed by the trial Court in Cr.M.P.No.1690 of 2010 in Crl.M.P.No.450 of 2010 dated 18.01.2011 is contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case.

4. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants contends that the trial Court failed to appreciate that the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the invocation of Section 8 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944.

5. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants submits that a sum of Rs.86,93,500/- was tainted money and that the claim of the Respondent/Petitioner that it belong to her, was a fallacious one.

6. Advancing his arguments, the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants proceeds to contend that the investigation in the case revealed that the Accused had produced copies of two alleged sale agreements before the Investigating Officer in the case. Further, one sale agreement dated 05.05.2008 related to the proposed sale of house plot for Rs.88,00,000/-and that an advance of Rs.80,00,000/- was received as an advance.

7. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants strenuously submits that it was inconceivable that an individual entering into a sale agreement for a consideration of Rs.88,00,000/- would part with a sum of Rs.80,00,000/- as an advance.

8. Added further, the Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants contends that the non-judicial stamp paper used for the preparation of the alleged sale agreement itself was received on 06.06.2008 but the sale agreement was dated 05.05.2008. Moreover, the sale agreement dated 07.05.2008 was between the Respondent and her own tenant and the recitals were to the effect that out of sale consideration of Rs.25,00,000/- an advance of Rs.15,00,000/-was received by her.

9. The Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the Appellants submits that the trial Court failed to take into account that a sum of Rs.86,93,500/- which was recovered from five different Bank Lockers was nothing but an ill-gotten money of the Respondent/Petitioner's Husband and the same was liable to be forfeited.

10. Lastly, it is represented on behalf of the Appellants that the trial Court had not taken