Material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders it void unless made with the consent of all parties involved, as per Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Disappointed plaintiff in view of the dismissal of the suit in O.S.No.520 of 2006 by the trial Court/1st Additional District Munsif, Tirunelveli and dismissal of first appeal in A.S.No.25 of 2010, by the Principal Sub Judge, Tirunelveli, directed this Second Appeal.

2. Plaintiff laid up the said suit for recovery of principal amount of Rs.50,000/- together with interest on the footing of Ex.A.1 Promissory Note dated 20.09.2003. He issued Ex.A.3, suit notice dated 17.08.2006, which was replied to by the defendants under Ex.A.5. It is further alleged that since no money was paid, the suit has been instituted.

3. The defendants resisted the suit raising several contentions. The principal among them are that the suit is barred by time, because of material alteration in Ex.A.1, it is invalid under Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the very execution of Ex.A.1 has not been proved and the signatures in Ex.A.1 are not of defendants and on the alleged date of execution of Ex.A.1, the 1st defendant was elsewhere (alibi), namely, was working in Tamilnadu Civil Supplies Corporation Office in Theni.

4. The trial Court rejected the plea of bar of limitation and also the plea of material alteration, however, it concluded that the plaintiff had not proved the due execution of Ex.A.1 by examining independent witness and the plaintiff has not specifically pinpointed the actual scribe of Ex.A.1, whether it was 1st defendant or 2nd defendant and ultimately dismissed the suit.

5. The very same conclusion has been reached by the first appellate Court, resulting in dismissal of the first appeal.

6. Under these circumstances, the Second Appeal has been directed by the appellant.

7. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Ex.A.1 is dated 20.09.2003. The suit has been filed on 20.09.2006. So, it is within time. Even taking the alteration in Ex.A.1 as such, it will not benefit the plaintiff and thus it is not a material alteration.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that both the Courts below have rightly rejected the plea of bar of limitation and also the plea of material alteration.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant would also submit that there is no law that a promissory note should be attested by a witness. In this case, admittedly, there is no attestor. In such circumstances, adding and padding and parading of witnesses to prove the fact-in-issue, namely, execution of Ex.A.1 is not necessary. The due execution has been duly proved through the testimony of P.W.1.

10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the plea as to limitation being a vain attempt, the respondents /defendant did not pursue it here. However, they focussed their full attention on the plea of material alteration in Ex.A.1.

11. The learned counsel for the respondents would also add that the person who is in possession/holder of the instrument has to explain to the Court as to how the alterations are crept in in Ex.A.1, but the plaintiff did not do so.

12. The learned counsel also would submit that if a negotiable instrument shows material alteration, it would be another instrument than the instrument executed with the common intention of both the parties.

13. The learned counsel for the respondent would cite VYTHINATHAN VS. MURUGAYYA PADAYACHI AND ANOTHER (1985 TNLJ 265) and certain portions of commentary in V.R.Manohar & W.W. Chitaley's 'THE AIR MANUAL, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 5TH EDITION' based on the decisions reported in AIR 1935 MAD 40 (40) and AIR 1940 PC 160 (163) and submitted that the fact that material alteration do not advance the interest of the holder of the instrument would not wash out the plea of material alteration.

14. Thus, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that Ex.A.1 is invalid because of material alterations therein and such an instrument cannot be enforced in a Court of law.

15. Exs.X.1 and X.2 would show that on the date, namely, 20.09.2003, on which Ex.A.1 is alleged to h