The executing court's powers under Section 47, C.P.C. are narrow and limited to determining questions between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree.

P.R. Shivakumar, J.

1. The Decree-holder, who obtained a Decree for Specific Performance against the Respondents 1 & 2 herein in O.S. No. 368 of 1998 on the file of Sub-Court, Sankari, is the Petitioner in the present Revision Petition. The said Suit was filed by the Revision Petitioner against the Respondents herein on the basis of a registered Sale Agreement dated 17.9.1998 executed by the Second Respondent herein, who figured as the First Defendant in the above said Suit. The other admitted fact is that the First Respondent herein (Second Defendant in the Suit) purchased the Suit property subsequent to the above said Sale Agreement dated 17.9.1998 and before the filing of the above said Suit for Specific Performance. The following dates will make the picture clear:

It will be obvious from the above said facts that the First Respondent chose to get a Sale Deed in respect of the suit property subsequent to the execution of the Sale Agreement dated 17.9.1998 and prior to the filing of the Suit for Specific Performance. That was the reason why the Revision Petitioner (Decree-holder) chose to file the Suit not only against the Second Respondent (First Defendant), but also against the First Respondent herein (Second Defendant) on the premise that the First Respondent, being a subsequent purchaser, was bound by the commitment made in the Suit Sale Agreement dated 17.9.1998 by the Second Respondent. The First Respondent herein (Second Defendant) who did have the opportunity of claiming that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of specific performance if at all there had been novation of the Agreement by a subsequent understanding that the Agreement would be given a go by or that being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the prior Agreement, his right was to be protected. Unfortunately the First Respondent/Second Defendant did not enter appearance to resist the claim made by the Revision Petitioner in the above said Suit and paved the way for the passing of an ex parte Decree dated 29.6.2009 directing execution of the Sale Deed in accordance with the Suit Sale Agreement dated 17.9.1998. The Decree also directed the First Respondent herein/Second Defendant to join with the Second Respondent/First Defendant in executing a Sale Deed in accordance with the Suit Sale Agreement as a subsequent purchaser bound by the agreement entered into by his vendor. The Second Respondent herein/First Defendant also remained ex parte and that was the reason why ex parte trial was conducted and an ex parte Decree came to be passed.

2. After the passing of the Decree, the Revision Petitioner chose to file R.E.P. No. 92 of 2004 for the execution of the Decree. The said R.E.P. came to be filed on 6.9.2004. The First Respondent could have atleast preferred an Application before the Trial Court to set aside the ex parte Decree immediately after receiving Notice in the Execution Petition, of course, along with an Application to condone the delay in filing the same. The First Respondent, instead of doing it, chose to file an Application on the execution side as R.E.A. No. 302 of 2005 in R.E.P. No. 92 of 2004 on 13.10.2005 under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, contending that the Decree was in executable because it was obtained in suppression of a pre-suit arrangement among the First Respondent, Second Respondent and all the creditors of the Second Respondent including the Revision Petitioner, pursuant to which alone the First Respondent got a Sale Deed in his favour on 29.10.1998.

3. Of course, the Executing Court passed an Order on 22.1.2007 rejecting the Application filed on the execution side under Section 47, C.P.C. opining that the said Application was not maintainable. As against the said Order, the First Respondent approached this Court by filing a Revision in C.R.P. (NPD) No. 2447 of 2007. A learned Judge of this Court, after hearing, held that an Application filed under Section 47, C.P.C. could not be dismissed in