The main legal point established in the judgment is the need for a liberal approach and reasonableness in exercising discretion to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to prevent the defeat of substantive rights.

1. Aggrieved over the fair and final orders, passed in I.A.No.57 of 2012 in O.S.No.85 of 2006 and I.A.No.58 of 2012 in O.S.No.87 of 2006 on the file of II Additional District Court, Salem, the plaintiffs have filed the above Civil Revision Petitions.

2. Since similar facts and circumstances are involved in both the Civil Revision Petitions, they are disposed of by this Common Order.

3. The plaintiffs filed suits in O.S.Nos.85 of 2006 and 87 of 2006 for Specific Performance or in the alternative for refund of the advance money.

4. The defendants filed the written statement in the respective suits and were contesting the suit. While so, on 17.8.2009, the trial Court decreed the suit ex-parte, for the reason that the defendants failed to appear before the trial Court on the said date. Thereafter, the defendants filed applications in I.A.No.57 of 2012 in O.S.No.85 of 2006 and I.A.No.58 of 2012 in O.S.No.87 of 2006, to condone the delay of 873 days in filing the petitions to set aside the exparte decree, passed in O.S.Nos.85 of 2006 and 87 of 2006 on 17.8.2009. The petitions were contested by the plaintiffs before the trial court.

5. The trial Court, after taking into consideration the case of both the parties, condoned the delay in filing the petitions to set aside the exparte decree passed in O.S.Nos. 85 of 2006 and 87 of 2006 and allowed both the applications. Aggrieved over the same, the plaintiffs have filed the above Civil Revision Petitions.

6. Heard Mr.T.R. Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr.S. Parthasarathy, learned Senior Counsel appearinig for the respondents.

7. Mr.T.R. Rajagopalan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners/plaintiffs submitted that the defendants have not explained the reasons for the delay in a proper manner. Therefore, the trial Court ought not to have condoned the delay. Further, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that after passing of the ex-parte decree in the suits, the defendants received the Notice in the Execution Petitions in REP Nos.4 and 5 of 2005, however, they did not appear before the Executing Court on 25.2.2010, therefore, the defendants have been set exparte in the Execution Petitions also. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied upon the following judgments:

(i) 2012 (12) SCC 693 (B. Madhuri Goud vs B. Daamodar Reddy), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

6. “The expression “sufficient cause” used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters to that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay.”

7. “In Collector (LA) v Katiji this Court made a departure from the earlier judgments in which strict interpretation was placed on the expressioin “sufficient cause” and observed: (SCC pp.108-09, para 3)

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence of the instution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:

(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an app