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2015 Supreme(Mad) 2551
IN THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
K.K.SASIDHARAN, J.
S.Gajendran - Petitioner
Vs.
Natarajan - Respondent
C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.1119 of 2015 and M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2015
Decided On : 9.07.2015
Advocate Appeared:
For Petitioner: Mr. G.Prabhu Rajadurai
For Respondent: Mr. N.Subramanian
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the exercise of discretion by the court in condoning the delay, emphasizing the need for a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' and the consideration of the cause shown for the delay afresh.
Headnote:
Delay Condonation - Exparte Decree - Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 - [O.S.No.352 of 2008] - [Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963] - The court discussed the delay condonation application filed by the petitioner to set aside the exparte decree in O.S.No.352 of 2008. The court referred to key legal provisions such as Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and interpreted the term 'sufficient cause' as per the Supreme Court judgments in M.K.Prasad v. P.Arumugam, Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, GMG Eng. Industries vs. ISSA Green Power Solution, and N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy. The court emphasized the need for a liberal construction of 'sufficient cause' and the exercise of discretion with vigilance and circumspection. It also highlighted the importance of considering the cause shown for the delay afresh and the attempt to compensate the loss sustained by the other party while condoning the delay.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner failed to appear before the Trial Court in a suit for declaration and consequential injunction, resulting in an exparte decree. The petitioner filed an application to condone the delay of 791 days in filing the petition to set aside the exparte decree. The Trial Judge dismissed the application primarily on the ground of failure to explain each day's delay.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Trial Judge failed to consider the core issue raised by the petitioner and emphasized the need to invalidate the decree, which was a default decree, not on merits. The court also referred to Supreme Court judgments and observed that the delay condonation is a matter of discretion of the court and should be exercised with due diligence.
Issues: The issues revolved around the delay condonation application, the validity of the exparte decree, and the petitioner's contention regarding the intimation sent by his advocate not reaching him.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the need for a liberal construction of the term, and the exercise of discretion with vigilance and circumspection. The court also emphasized the consideration of the cause shown for the delay afresh and the attempt to compensate the loss sustained by the other party while condoning the delay.
Final Decision: The order dated 10 March, 2015 was set aside, and the application in I.A.No.651 of 2012 was allowed, subject to the payment of a sum of Rs.15,000/- by way of cost to the respondent.
This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 10 March, 2015 in I.A.No.651 of 2012, whereby and where under, the learned Principal District Munsif, Thoothukudi, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner to condone the delay in filing the application to set aside the exparte decree.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent.
3. The respondent filed a suit against the petitioner and 13 others in O.S.No.352 of 2008 before the learned Principal District Munsif, Thoothukudi. It was a suit for declaration and consequential injunction. The petitioner failed to appear before the Trial Court and the same resulted in passing an exparte decree. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an application to condone the delay of 791 days in filing the petition to set aside the exparte decree. The learned Trial Judge dismissed the application primarily on the ground of failure on the part of the petitioner to explain each day's delay.
4. The documents available on record would show that the petitioner entered appearance in O.S.No.352 of 2008. Since he failed to file written statement, he was set exparte. In the meantime, he was transferred to Chennai. The petitioner has taken up a contention that the intimation sent by his advocate did not reach him and as such, he was not aware of the exparte decree passed by the Trial Court.
5. While dismissing the application filed by the petitioner in I.A.No.651 of 2012, the learned Trial Judge failed to consider the core issue raised by the petitioner that the decree in O.S.No.352 of 2008 was not on merits. It was a default decree, consequent to the non-appearance of petitioner.
6. The petitioner has taken up certain substantial contentions to invalidate the decree in O.S.No.352 of 2008. In case the application is dismissed and delay is not condoned, it would not be possible for the petitioner to plead and prove his version before the Trial Court.
7. The Supreme Court in M.K.Prasad v. P.Arumugam [2001(6) SCC 176], while considering the question regarding delay in applying for setting aside the exparte decree, observed that the Court ought to keep in mind the judgment impugned in the matter, the extent of property involved and the stake of the parties, while deciding an application to set aside the exparte decree.
8. The Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [2002(3) SCC 195], explained the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court very clearly observed that explanation for the delay should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case. The Supreme Court said:
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by takin
