P.R. Shivakumar, J.

1. The above said second appeal came to be filed by N. Manoharan, the plaintiff in the original suit O.S. No. 945 of 1988 on the file of Additional District Munsif, Kallakurichi, who suffered a decree dismissing the said suit in the hands of the trail Court, which decree was also confirmed by the lower appellate Court in A.S. No. 206 of 1996 by a judgment and decree dated 08.02.1999. Pending second appeal, K. Ramanathan seems to have got a sale deed dated 16.06.2008 registered as Document No. 1692 of 2008 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Thiyagadurgam, in respect of the suit property claimed by the original appellant N. Manoharan to be his absolute property. Based on the purchase, the purchaser under the said document, namely K. Ramanathan along with the original appellant N. Manoharan has filed C.M.P. No. 381 of 2015 for impleading K. Ramanathan as a co-appellant. As K. Ramanathan is a purchaser pendente lite, his purchase shall be subject to the result of the second appeal. However, the apprehension of the purchaser K. Ramanathan was sought to be allayed by the vendor by co-opting the purchaser as a petitioner for being impleaded as a co-appellant so that he can pursue the appeal to his satisfaction without any grievance that the vendor, after sale, lost interest and enthusiasm in conducting the second appeal. Under the said circumstances, though the purchaser is a not a necessary party, he can be impleaded as a proper party. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents also submits that the respondents are not going to be prejudiced and they do have no objection for impleading K. Ramanathan, the alleged purchaser from Manoharan, the original appellant, as a co-appellant. Hence, C.M.P. No. 381 of 2015 is allowed and the first petitioner therein namely K. Ramanathan is impleaded as Appellant No. 2 in the second appeal.

2. The Appellants 1 and 2 are represented by one and the same counsel. All the three respondents are also represented by one and the same counsel.

3. The arguments advanced by Ms. Mythili Suresh, learned counsel for the appellants 1 and 2 and by Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 3 are heard. The judgments of the Courts below, the grounds of second appeal and other materials available on record sent for from the courts below are perused and taken into consideration.

4. In order to avoid confusion and for achieving clarity, the parties are referred to in accordance with their ranks in the original suit. At appropriate places their ranks in the second appeal are also furnished.

5. The unsuccessful plaintiff, who failed in his attempt to get a decree for bare injunction as claimed by him against the defendants in both the Courts, has come forward with the present second appeal. The second appeal was admitted on 31.10.2003 identifying the following questions to be the substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal:

1. Whether the Courts below are right in law in rejecting the claim of the appellant to a portion of the suit property by discarding Exs. A1 to A3 and by misreading Exs. B1 to B5?

2. Whether Ex. B1 - title deed of the respondents confirms the title of the appellant to the vacant site north of their property which is the suit property and the same was admitted by DW 1? Whether the Courts below are right in law in brushing side Ex. B1 and admission of DW 1?

6. Though two questions were formulated at the time of admission, in fact, the same can be condensed into a single question. The learned counsel for the appellants also, during her arguments, contends that the only contention raised by the appellants is that the finding of the Courts below holding the defendants to be entitled to half of the vacant site and well forming part of the suit property is perverse. Hence, the substantial questions are condensed into a single substantial question and is formulated as follows:

"Whether the findings of the Courts below that the defendants (respondents in