2014 Supreme(Mad) 4535
MADRAS HIGH COURT
S.Tamilvanan, J.
G. Ramakrishnan - Appellant
Versus.
L. Murugan - Respondent
S.A. No.629 of 2008 & M.P.No.1 of 2008 and M.P.No.1 of 2011
Decided on : 30.10.2014
Mr. R.Gandhi, Senior Counsel for Mr. S.Senthil Murugan
Mr. S.V.Jeyaraman, Senior Counsel for Mr. D.Rajasekar
Headnote:
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Sections 16, 20 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Specific Performance – Second Appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree, passed in A.S. on the file of the Principal District Judge, Villupuram, reversing the Judgment and Decree, passed in O.S. on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kallkurichi. – Held, Relief of specific performance is admittedly an equitable relief. – The first appellate court has not properly considered that the respondent / plaintiff has not come to court with clean hands and has suppressed the material facts relating to the case. – In the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that the first appellate court is not right in granting the equitable relief, holding that the respondent / plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. – It is crystal clear that the respondent / plaintiff is not entitled to seek the discretionary relief of specific performance on the ground that he has not come to court with clean hands and also on account of suppression of material facts. – Hence, the substantial questions of law 2 and 3 are also answered in favour of the appellant /defendant and against the respondent / plaintiff. – However, as there is no cross-appeal preferred by the appellant / defendant against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, in respect of the advance amount, it has to be legally presumed that the judgment and decree passed by the trial court has not been assailed by the appellant / defendant herein. – Second Appeal Allowed
The Second Appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree, dated 30.01.2008 passed in A.S.No.50 of 2006 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Villupuram, reversing the Judgment and Decree, dated 30.03.2006 passed in O.S.No.112 of 2003 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Kallkurichi.
2. It is seen that the suit was filed by the respondent herein against the appellant, seeking specific performance of the contract, delivery of possession and other consequential relief. After the trial, the suit was decreed, directing the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/- with costs, in lieu of specific performance and further, held that the plaintiff is entitled to interest for the said amount, Rs.50,000/- at the rate of 6% per annum from 10.01.2002 till the date of realisation. Aggrieved by which, appeal was preferred by the plaintiff in A.S.No.50 of 2006. By Judgment, dated 30.01.2008, the appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court, directing the defendant to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, who is the respondent herein with other consequential relief and costs. Aggrieved by which, the defendant in the suit has preferred this second appeal.
3. This second appeal has been admitted on the following Substantial Questions of Law:
"1. Whether the lower appellate court is right in not applying the settled proposition of law in a suit for specific performance, that even if it is lawful to do so, the Court can exercise its vested discretionary powers under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and refuse to grant such relief on sound and settled principles, more particularly when it would be grossly inequitable to enforce specific performance and would ultimately result in victimization of the alleged vendor?
2. Whether lower appellate Court is right in not considering the specific issue whether the plaintiff has established the existence of a valid agreement of sale and his readiness and willingness to execute the same, which are twin mandatory conditions for a suit for specific performance, merely because the defendant has not filed any cross appeal against the findings of trial court to that extent?
3. Even though the defendant has not filed cross appeal over the observation of the trial Court, the lower appellate Court ought to have considered the issue relating to the existence of valid agreement of sale and plaintiff's readiness and willingness to execute the same, since the relief of specific performance is an equitable relief. Whether the lower appellate Court is right in failure to adhering to such procedure?"
4. The first Substantial Question of Law raised by the appellant is that in a suit seeking specific performance even if the claim is lawful to do so, the Court can exercise its vested discretionary powers under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, whereby refuse to grant such relief on sound and settled principles, more particularly when it would be grossly inequitable to enforce specific performance as it would ultimately result in victimization of the alleged vendor.
5. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act,1963, reads as follows:
Discretion as to decreeing specific performance: (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal."
6. The respondent/plaintiff has averred that he had entered into an agreement of sale with the appellant/defendant on 10.01.2002 in respect of purchasing the suit schedule property for a total sale consideration of Rs.2 lacs. Out of which, a sum of Rs.50,000/- was paid as advance and part of sale consideration on the date of the agreement, 10.01.2002 and as per the terms of agreement, the respon