The main legal point established is the requirement for tax authorities to grant an opportunity of personal hearing and follow principles of natural justice in tax proceedings.

M. Jaichandren, J.

W.P.No.39378 of 2015 to W.P.No.39385 of 2015 & W.A. No.22 of 2016 to W.A.No.29 of 2016:

Since the issues involved in all the writ petitions and the writ appeals are similar in nature, they have been taken up together and a common Judgment is being passed.

2. The writ petitions in W.P.No.39378 of 2015, W.P.No.39379 of 2015, W.P.No.39380 of 2015, W.P.No.39381 of 2015, W.P.No.39382 of 2015, W.P.No.39383 of 2015, W.P.No.39384 of 2015 and W.P.No.39385 of 2015, had been filed praying that this Court may be pleased to issue writs of Certiorari to call for and to quash the impugned proceedings of the first respondent, dated 30.10.2015.

3. It has been stated that the petitioner company is a public limited company engaged in the business of development and sale of land. It is registered under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. While so, it had incurred certain expenses for the leveling of the land, laying of roads and for the creation of other infrastructural facilities, before the plots were advertised and sold. The petitioner had not constructed any flats or residential apartments for its customers. The petitioner had sold 213 plots in phase I and 89 plots in phase II of its development scheme, for which sale deeds had been registered.

4. It has been further stated that, in spite of the fact that the petitioner had filed detailed objections, dated 17.6.2015, before the respondents 2 and 3 and it had also filed the objections, dated 21.9.2015, before the first respondent, explaining the fact that it had effected only sale of land, which cannot be considered as 'goods' falling under Section 2(21) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). There was no construction of flats or civil works contract executed by the petitioner, and therefore, there had been no transfer of goods involved in such transaction. However, the first respondent had considered the land development and construction charges incurred by the petitioner, up to the period 2011-12, as the sale consideration, for the construction of the flats and had determined the deemed sales value and had levied tax and also levied penalty, under Section 27(3) of the Act, in the impugned proceedings, when there was no proposal to levy such penalty in the pre-revision notices, dated 20.8.2015.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had contented, inter alia, that the impugned proceedings issued by the first respondent are arbitrary, illegal and void, as no opportunity of personal hearing had been given to the petitioner before such proceedings had been issued.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had pointed out that the petitioner had sent a letter, dated 19.9.2015, to the first respondent requesting that extension of time may be granted, till 5.10.2015, for filing its reply and had also made a request to allow the representative of the petitioner to appear in person to present its case, appropriately, on a convenient date, thereafter. However, the first respondent had proceeded to pass the impugned proceedings without considering the request made by the petitioner. As such, the first respondent had passed the impugned proceedings without following the principles of natural justice and therefore, this Court may be pleased to set aside the said proceedings and to remit the matter back to the first respondent to pass appropriate orders relating to the relevant year concerned, by considering the objections submitted by the petitioner and by giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner to put forth its case.

7. The learned counsel had further submitted that the first respondent may cause an inspection of the property concerned by way of spot verification, if an application is made by the petitioner making such a request.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents had submitted that the impugned proceedings had bee