The central legal point established in the judgment is the admissibility and reliability of multiple dying declarations, emphasizing the principles of dying declaration under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and the need to examine eminently arguable points during the main appeal for granting appeal bail under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C.

The sole accused in S.C.No.72 of 2014 on the file of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, [Fast Track Mahila Court], Dharmapuri, seeks suspension of his sentence by granting him appeal bail under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C.

2. After trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced him as under:

The fine amount has been paid.

3. PW1's daughter Mekala attempted suicide on 01.07.2010 by pouring kerosene upon herself. She was rushed to the hospital with extensive burn injuries. On 01.07.2010, she gave oral statement to PW10-Doctor [A.R.Copy Ex.P5]; on 02.07.2010, she gave statement to PW12-Judicial Magistrate [Ex.P8] and on 04.07.2010 she gave statement to PW11-Head Constable [Ex.P6-FIR]. On 05.07.2010, she died.

4. In such circumstances, under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, the said three statements of Mekala to Doctor [oral]; to Judicial Magistrate [judicial] and to Head Constable [written] have become dying declarations. Although, it was given to PW11- Head Constable, it also becomes a Dying Declaration under Section 162(2) Cr.P.C r/w 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Now, in this case, there are multiple, plural dying declarations. The trial court relied on the Dying Declaration recorded by PW12-Judicial Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused as stated already.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the dying declarations given before the Doctor and given before the Magistrate are contradictory. One excludes the other. There are contrary version in the dying declaration given to the police/PW11 as to certain vital aspects. In such circumstances, it is highly unsafe to act upon the dying declaration given by the deceased to PW12.

6. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the following decisions:

(i) Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf vs. State of Karnataka [(2007) 13 SCC 112]

(ii) Lakhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 8 SCC 514]

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even taking the allegations levelled against the accused as such, it would not warrant an offence under Section 306 IPC. Mekala was a weak minded woman. There is paucity of any positive act on the part of the accused. In such circumstances, an offence under Section 306 IPC will not arise.

8. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite the following decisions:

(i) Sanju alias Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2002) 5 SCC 371]

(ii) Mani vs. State rep.by the Inspector of Police, J-3, Guindy Police Station, Chennai [(2014) 3 MLJ (Crl) 18]

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there is prima facie case in favour of the petitioner. He was on bail throughout the trial court proceedings. He may be granted appeal bail.

10. On the other hand, the learned Government Advocate (Cri.side) would submit that the accused and the deceased are within prohibited degree of relationship. They are in the nature of brother and sister. The accused fancied for her. The accused forgotten their consanguinity. The deceased chided him. Yet the accused did not budge. In such circumstances, unable to bear the shameless act, she had committed suicide.

11. The learned Government Advocate further contended that she had stated to PW12-Judicial Magistrate that because of the shameless act committed by the accused, she had committed suicide. In such circumstances, the trial court has rightly convicted him and punished him. There is no prima facie case in his favour.

12. I have anxiously considered the rival submissions; perused the trial court's judgment, gone through the relevant evidence pointed out by either side and also the various decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

13. Now the question is whether in the f