The main legal point established in the judgment is that to attract Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the debt or liability must be legally recoverable/enforceable, and the burden of proof lies with the complainant to establish the liability beyond all reasonable doubt.

The Appellant/Complainant has focused the instant Criminal Appeal before this Court as against the Judgment passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate, (Fast Track Court at Magisterial Level No.II), Coimbatore in S.T.C.No.100 of 2012 dated 17.07.2014.

2. The Learned Judicial Magistrate, (Fast Track Court at Magisterial Level No.II), Coimbatore, while passing the impugned judgment in S.T.C.No.100 of 2012 on 17.07.2014 at para 18, among other things had observed that ....it is concluded that the complainant had failed to explain the absence of the endorsement dated 01/02/2011 in Ex.D5. Since the complainant failed to explain the same, the endorsement dated 01.02.2011 in Ex.P1 and the promissory note dated 01.02.2011 (Ex.P2) said to have been executed based on the endorsement dated 01.02.2011 also fails. It was established that the complainant had the habit of getting blank cheques as security for the transactions with the accused, which forces to believe that the cheque (Ex.P3) would have been obtained as security. All these aspects creates doubt on the complainant's case. The standard of proof prescribed for the defence side is preponderance of probability, whereas, the standard of proof for the complainant is proof beyond all reasonable doubt. The standard of proof for the complainant is heavy when compared to the accused. The defence side was able to establish doubt in the complainant's case by probable defence and had successfully rebutted the presumption drawn under Section 139 N.I. Act by preponderance of probability. The complainant had failed to prove the reverse burden beyond all reasonable doubt. In fine, the accused is not guilty for the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act and found the Respondent/Accused not guilty in respect of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and acquitted him in terms of ingredients of Section 255(1) of Cr.P.C.

3. Assailing the correctness, validity and legality of the judgment of acquittal dated 17.07.2014 passed by the trial Court, the Appellant/Complainant has preferred the present Appeal mainly contending that the Respondent/Accused had admitted the liability of loan amount which was due to be paid to the Appellant/Complainant and further that, the Respondent/Accused had admitted the signatures in Ex.P1 to Ex.P3 and under these circumstances, the trial Court should have held that the cheque Ex.P3 in question was issued towards the liability incurred by the Respondent/Accused.

4. Expatiating his submission, the Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant projects an argument that Ex.P3 cheque was issued only to discharge the liability incurred by the Respondent/Accused for the repayment of loan amount and in reality, the Respondent/ Accused had failed to adduce any evidence that he had discharged his liability to the complainant, of course, in a satisfactory manner. It is represented on behalf of the Appellant/Complainant that the trial Court should not have dismissed the complaint merely on the basis that the endorsement found in Ex.P1 (Memorandum of Understanding dated 31.07.2009) was not present in Ex.D5 (Sale Agreement dated 02.03.2006). Moreover, the signature in the endorsement portion was not denied as forged or proved to be forged.

5. The Learned counsel for the Appellant/Complainant takes a plea that the previous transactions would not be of any help to the Respondent/Accused to establish that the present cheque, namely, Ex.P3 dated 08.04.2011 was given only for the purpose of security.

6. The Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that once the liability is admitted and the cheque was issued together with a pro-note to discharge the liability by the Respondent/Accused, then, he would not be permitted to take a contra stand that the cheque in question was issued for the purpose of security without establishing that the liability towards the complaint was discharged, even by means of 'preponderance of probabilities'.

7. Yet another contending pr