The court has the discretion to condone a delay of three days in filing an appeal and can direct the appellant to deposit a sum of money in the court as a condition for prosecuting the appeal.

G. Rajasuria, J.

This second appeal is focused by D2, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 28.03.2012 passed by the learned District Judge, Tiruvallur in A.S.No.3 of 2011 in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation and thereby confirming the common judgment and decree dated 22.01.2010 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Poonamallee in O.S.No.203 of 1996.

2. The parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.

3. The germane facts, absolutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal as well as the two miscellaneous petitions would run thus:

(a) As many as eight plaintiffs, filed the suit seeking the following reliefs:

- for a declaration that the plaintiffs 1 to 7 are the owners of the suit property situate at 82, Maduraivoil village, Chengai MGR District comprised in S.No.13/1A1 13/1A2, 13/1B, 13/2 and 13/3 measuring an extent of 26.50 acres or thereabout more fully described in the schedule here under and consequentially

- for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants their men, agents servants or any person or persons from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property perpetually more fully described in the plaint schedule here under:

- grant such further or other reliefs.

- cost of the suit. (extracted as such)

(b) D1 filed the written statement, which was adopted by D2, who is the sole appellant in this second appeal.

(c) The trial court framed the issues.

(d) Up went the trial, during which, on the plaintiff's side P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined; and Exs.A1 to A12 were marked; on the defendants' side, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B49 were marked.

4. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit; as against which appeal was filed by D2; D1 died pendente lite. The first appellate court after hearing both sides, dismissed the appeal on the sole ground that the appeal was filed without seeking to get the delay of three days' condoned.

5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the appellant herein- V.K. Ramamoorthy filed earlier CRP (NPD) No. 2046 of 2012 before this court and that CRP was disposed of vide order dated 31.07.2012 giving him opportunity to file second appeal as against the judgment and decree of the first appeal. As such, this second appeal has been focussed by D2 setting out various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law:

1. Whether the lower appellate court was right in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation?

2. Whether the appellant was not entitled to computation of period of limitation on the basis of decree obtained in respect of the first application for copy of decree, more so since the same had been with an endorsement to that effect?

3. Whether the lower appellate court had not erred in holding that the benefit of computation of limitation with respect to decree obtained first cannot be granted in the absence of all application, more so since the lower appellate court had directed registering the appeal which would amount to implied grant of permission/leave?

4. Whether the lower appellate court had not erred in denying the benefit of exclusion of intervening weekend holidays in filing the copy application for computation of period of limitation?

5. Without prejudice to the above, whether the lower appellate court had not erred in defacing the appeal without granting the appellant an opportunity of filing appropriate application for condonation of the delay?

6. Whether the lower appellate court had not erred in not condoning the delay if any, without insisting on an application in view of the facts and of the case?

7. Whether the lower appellate court after holding that there was a delay in presentation of the appeal had not erred in not returning the appeal papers for proper presentation?

8. Whether the lower appellate court had jurisdiction and power to entertain an application to deface an appeal after it had been entertained