M. Venugopal, J.

The Appellant/Complainant has filed the instant Criminal Appeal before this Court as against the order of dismissal dated 30.12.2015 in C.C. No.77 of 2007 passed by the Learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Krishnagiri.

2. At the outset, this Court points out that today, Crl. O.P. No. 24235 of 2016 [seeking Grant of Special Leave to prefer an Appeal] was allowed by this Court for the reasons assigned therein.

3. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant/Complainant urges before this Court that the Appellant/Complainant was not present only for two hearings on 01.12.2015 and 30.12.2015. In fact, as on date of passing of the dismissal order on 30.12.2015 in C.C. No.77 of 2007, NBW was pending against the Respondent/Accused and that apart, the Respondent/Accused, without receiving summons, is dragging on the matter for nearly eight years.

4. Advancing his arguments, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant takes a plea that when a Bailable Warrant was issued against the Respondent/Accused, the Appellant/Complainant was always ready and willing to conduct the case.

5. Expatiating his submissions, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant brings it to the notice of this Court that the Appellant/Complainant's Advocate had died and further, his junior Counsel, who was representing the Appellant/Complainant before the trial Court, was appointed as Government Pleader and therefore, he could not represent the Complainant in time on 30.12.2015.

6. Lastly, it is contended that for the fault of the Counsel, in not representing the Appellant's case, the client should not suffer.

7. It is an axiomatic principle in Law that in an Appeal against an order of acquittal, the Hon'ble High Court possesses all the powers and nothing less than the powers it possesses while hearing an Appeal against an order of conviction. Also, the High Court, on a scrutiny and reappraisal of the matter coupled with the available materials on record, can take a different view provided the findings recorded by the trial Court are a perverse and erroneous one. If there is any misreading of evidence or if a Point of Law or Fact is not taken into consideration by the trial Court at the time of passing the impugned order, then, that is also a good ground for the High Court to interfere with the orders of the trial Court.

8. It is true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of an Accused persons and such presumption gets strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court. Only in exceptional circumstances, the Appellate Court for compelling reasons can interfere with the order of the trial Court and can reverse the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, if the conclusions arrived at are contrary to the evidence on record or if the trial Court's approach in dealing with the entire subject matter in issue is found to be patently illegal or if the Judgment is unreasonable and is based on an erroneous appreciation of the Law and of the Facts of the case.

9. As far as the present case is concerned, this Court is of the considered view that when once the Appellant/Complainant had filed the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and when the same was taken cognizance of by the trial Court and it is his prime duty to appear for the hearing of the case until his presence is dispensed with.

10. It is true that on a given day, when the Complainant remained absent, the trial Court has a wide discretion either to dismiss the complaint and to acquit the Accused or to adjourn the hearing. Undoubtedly, the powers envisaged under Section 256 of the Criminal Procedure Code are to be exercised by a Court of Law with meticulous care, caution and circumspection. Moreover, the absence or presence of a lawyer may also be taken into account by the trial Court at the time of determining whether to postpone the hearing of the main case or not.

11. It may not be out of place for this Court to make a pertinent mention that when a Compl