2017 Supreme(Mad) 2709
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RAJIV SHAKDHER, ABDUL QUDDHOSE, JJ.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. – Appellant
Vs.
M. Rose & Ors. – Respondents
O.S.A.No.336 of 2011 and M.P.No.1 of 2011
Decided On : 11-07-2017
For the Appellant : Mr.M.Vijayan, M/s.King and Partridge
For the Respondents: Mr.P.R.Raman
Headnote:
Chennai City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 - Section 9 ,4 and 3 - Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 - Section 41 - This is an appeal preferred against the judgment and decree passed by learned Single Judge in C.S.No.370 - This is a second round of litigation -Suit had, initially, been decreed - Against said judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred to Division Bench, which was numbered as : O.S.A.No.192 - Appeal was dismissed - Against the said dismissal, a review petition was filed, which was also dismissed - Aggrieved by the same, the appellant carried the matter in appeal by way of Special Leave Petition - Appellant, has submitted that, since, during the pendency of suit proceedings, an application had been filed appellant would be protected as a tenant, in the very least, till such time, the suit was decreed - Learned counsel for the contesting respondents, i.e., respondents No.1 to 3, has submitted that application, which was moved was allowed the Court whereby, eight (8) weeks’ time was given to appellant to pay money, and therefore, the protection, if any, which, appellant enjoyed, dissolved on the expiry of the said time frame – Held, argument of learned counsel for appellant that, since, compensation had to be factored in, for the superstructure, while disposing of the suit for ejectment, in terms and therefore, appellant would continue to be dealt with as a protected tenant under the 1921 Act till the date of decree, and thereafter, for a period of three (3) months from the said date, is misconceived, as the provision for compensation has nothing to do with payment of damages by way of mesne profits - Former relates to wrongful occupation, while latter seeks to reimburse actual costs incurred in erecting superstructure – Court may only indicate that judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant in Properties (P) Limited V. Federal Motors (P) Limited, (2005) 1 SCC 705, is not applicable to facts and circumstances of the case - Judgment was rendered, in the context of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which, both in its scope and also ambit, is quite different from the provisions of 1921 Act, which we are called upon to consider - Judgment is, clearly, distinguishable on facts - Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed - Resultantly, pending application shall stand closed.
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J.
1. This is an appeal preferred against the judgment and decree dated 22.03.2010, passed by the learned Single Judge in C.S.No.370 of 2002.
2. This is a second round of litigation. The suit had, initially, been decreed on 29.04.2005. Against the said judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred to the Division Bench, which was numbered as : O.S.A.No.192 of 2005. The said appeal was dismissed on 01.09.2005. Against the said dismissal, a review petition was filed, which was also dismissed on 29.01.2007. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant carried the matter in appeal by way of Special Leave Petition.
2.1. In the interregnum, on 07.01.2006, the appellant had handed over possession of the suit property to respondents No.1 to 3.
2.2. The Supreme Court vide order dated 02.12.2009, while setting aside the judgment and decree dated 29.04.2005, remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge, only for the purpose of deciding one singular issue, which is, whether mesne profits should run from the date of expiry of the lease, or, from the date when, the decree for handing over possession was passed.
2.3. It is, in this context, the impugned judgment and decree has been passed by the learned Single Judge.
3. Mr.Vijayan, who appears for the appellant, has submitted that, since, during the pendency of the suit proceedings, an application had been filed under Section 9 of the Chennai City Tenants' Protection Act, 1921 (in short, “1921 Act”), the appellant would be protected as a tenant, in the very least, till such time, the suit was decreed, i.e., till 29.04.2005.
4. As against this, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, i.e., respondents No.1 to 3, has submitted that the application, which was moved under Section 9 of the 1921 Act, was allowed by the Court on 09.01.2003, whereby, eight (8) weeks time was given to the appellant to pay the money, and therefore, the protection, if any, which, the appellant enjoyed, dissolved on the expiry of the said time frame.
4.1. Learned counsel submitted that, since, the period of eight (8) weeks expired on 08.03.2003, the liability of the appellant to pay mesne profits, would run from 09.03.2003.
5. We may also note that during the course of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, and in order to buttress the stand taken and noticed hereinabove, it was contended that under Section 4 of the 1921 Act, the appellant had to be paid compensation for the superstructure, which it had erected on the suit land and therefore, in terms of the said section, it continued to enjoy the protection of a tenant as contemplated under the 1921 Act, till the date of the decree and for a period of three months thereafter.
5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that, though, the fact that under the provisions of Section 4 of the 1921 Act, the appellant would have enjoyed the protection of the 1921 Act for a period of three (3) months, beyond the date of the decree, the appellant has, consciously, chosen to confine the protection only till 29.04.2005, which is the date of the decree.
5.2. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Limited V. Federal Motors (P) Limited, (2005) 1 SCC 705.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. The contesting parties before us share a long litigation history. We do not wish to revisit the history, as the Supreme Court confined the issue, while setting aside the judgment and decree dated 29.04.2005, obtained by the respondent in the first round, to one singular issue, to which, we have made a reference above. Suffice it to say that the learned Single Judge has ruled that the appellant/defendant was entitled to protection under the 1921 Act from the date of filing of the suit, till 08.03.2003. Accordingly, the learned Judge has further ruled that respondents No.1 to 3, will be entitled to damages (i.e., mesne profits) at the r