The judgment establishes the mandatory nature of the pre-deposit requirement under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, and emphasizes the statutory right and conditions for entertaining an appeal.

S. Manikumar, J.

1. On 15.09.2017, we passed the following orders:

"By impugned proceedings dated 21.08.2017, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, has directed the appellant to make pre-deposit of Rs.40 Lakhs with the Registry of the appellate tribunal, out of which Rs.20 Lakhs to be paid within four weeks from 21.08.2017, as 1st part of payment and 2nd part of payment of Rs.20 Lakhs to be paid by another four weeks, thereafter.

2. Assailing the correctness of the same, Mr. Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner/guarantor submitted that earlier when the property of the borrower was sold, at the instance of ICICI Bank Limited, a sum of Rs.20 Lakhs, was set apart, for payment to Indian Bank, who had second charge of the secured assets and that, vide order in O.A.No.208 of 2003, dated 25.06.2007, DRT-I, Chennai has permitted ICICI bank, Limited, Chennai to deposit the said amount of Rs.20 Lakhs with the Recovery Officer of DRT-I, Chennai in the account O.A.No.143 of 2003, instituted by Indian Bank, Chennai, against M/s.Indian Food Fermentation Limited and five others, in which the writ petitioner has been arrayed as 3rd defendant. 3. Inviting the attention of this Court to the exparte order in O.A.No.143 of 2003 dated 04.04.2008 on the file of DRT-I, Chennai, Mr. Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner/borrower submitted that when the notice to 3rd defendant/ writ petitioner has been returned as 'unserved', the tribunal ought not to have passed an exparte order against the 3rd defendant. At best, an order can be made against, those, who have been served and remained exparte. 4. Mr. Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when the abovesaid order was challenged, in the appeal, DRAT has imposed a onerous condition.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that by the time the exparte order came to the knowledge of the petitioner, there was huge delay of 1146 days in filing an application to set aside the order made in O.A.No.143 of 2003 dated 04.04.2008 on the file of DRT-I, Chennai. Unfortunately, when M.A.No.24 of 2012 filed to condone the delay came up for hearing, the counsel could not appear and hence, M.A., was dismissed. Further on the next day a restoration petition viz., M.A.No.46 of 2014 was filed, which also came to be dismissed without considering the reasons for the absence.

6. When appeal was filed, against the order in MA.No.46 of 2014, (AIR No.429 of 2015), by imposing onerous condition of deposit of Rs.40 Lakhs, IA has been disposed of.

7. Heard Mr. Krishna Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner.

8. Going through the order made in O.A.No.143 of 2003 dated 04.04.2008, we are not able to discern any discussion or finding as to whether 3rd defendant therein/writ petitioner has been served. Thus, there is an arguable point to be considered in the application filed to condone the delay, though inordinate.

9. Time and again the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that technical objections should not be pitted against substantial justice. Abovesaid observations, are subject to scrutiny of facts and circumstances, justifying the delay, which the tribunal may have to address if ultimately, the application to condone the delay is taken up.

10. At this juncture, it is the contention of the writ petitioner that a sum of Rs.20 Lakhs has already been deposited to the credit of the loan Account with ICICI Bank in O.A.No.143 of 2003. Said submission is borne out of records.

11. In the light of the above, we are inclined to issue notice to the respondents through Court and privately, returnable by 09.10.2017.

12. Post on 09.10.2017.

13. Interim stay of impugned proceedings, till then, on condition that the petitioner deposits a sum of Rs.20 Lakhs with the Registrar of Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Chennai, within a period of three weeks from today."

2. On this day, when the matter came up for further hearing, based on the memo dated 27.09.2017 of