S. Manikumar, J.

1. Possession notice, dated 15/10/2015 and public notice, dated 15/12/2017, are challenged in the instant writ petition, by the borrower, on the grounds inter alia that there was no mortgage with Indian Overseas Bank, Chennai/respondent.

2. Submission has also been made that possession notice, dated 15/10/2015, does not contain the loan details. Petitioner has further contended that in a case registered by Central Bureau of Investigation, in the year 2013, Branch Manager, has been arrayed, as first respondent.

3. For the above said reasons, possession notice, dated 15/10/2015 and public notice, dated 15/12/2017, respectively are challenged.

4. Heard Mr. M. Theivakumar learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the materials available on record.

5. Possession notice, dated 15/10/2015, and public notice, dated 15/12/2017, in Dinamani newspaper and Indian Express, dated 15/10/2015, are extracted hereunder:-

“TAMIL”

6. Contention that there was no mortgage with the Bank and that the petitioner is in no way connected with the loan sanctioned by the Indian Overseas Bank, are factual matters, to be proved by adducing evidence before the Tribunal.

7. Statute provides for an alternative remedy. Further, Courts have consistently held that when there is an effective and alternative remedy, writ is not maintainable. We deem it fit to consider the following decisions.

(i) In Precision Fastenings v. State Bank of Mysore, reported in 2010(2) LW 86, a Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has held as follows:

“This Court has repeatedly held in a number of decisions right from the decision in Division Electronics Ltd. v. Indian Bank (DB) Markandey Katju, C.J., (2005 (3) C.T.C., 513), that the remedy of the aggrieved party as against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act is to approach the appropriate Tribunal and the writ petition is not maintainable. The same position has been succinctly stated by the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Transcore v. Union Of India (2006 (5) C.T.C. 753) in paragraph No. 26 wherein the Supreme Court has held as under:-

“The Tribunal under the DRT Act is also the Tribunal under the NPA Act. Under Section 19 of the DRT Act read with Rule 7 of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 (1993 Rules), the applicant bank or FI has to pay fees for filing such application to DRT under the DRT Act and, similarly, a borrower, aggrieved by an action under Section 13(4) of NPA Act was entitled to prefer an Application to the DRT under Section 17 of NPA.” (Emphasis added)”

(ii) In Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, reported in 2010 (5) LW 193 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph Nos.16 to 18 and 27 to 29, held as follows:

“16. The facts of the present case show that even after receipt of notices under Section 13(2) and (4) and order passed under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not bother to pay the outstanding dues. Only a paltry amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid by respondent No. 1 on 29.10.2007. She did give an undertaking to pay the balance amount in installments but did not honour her commitment. Therefore, the action taken by the appellant for recovery of its dues by issuing notices under Section 13(2) and 13(4) and by filing an application under Section 14 cannot be faulted on any legally permissible ground and, in our view, the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error by entertaining the writ petition of respondent No. 1.

17. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If respondent No. 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression any person used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the