The main legal point established in the judgment is the appeal process under Rule 5(5) of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, and the permissibility of filing an appeal without insisting on the period of limitation.

S. Manikumar, J.

1. Sarfaesi Application in S.A.No.168 of 2018, filed on 08.01.2018, challenging the notice, issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, has been returned by the Registry of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore, as hereunder:

"SA Scrutinized:

As per section 17(1) of the sarfaesi act, any person including the borrower aggrieved by any person including the borrower aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorized officer may make an application along with necessary fee as prescribed, to the DRT within 45 days from the date of measures taken. This appeal was filed by the appellants on 08.01.18 only and not within 45 days from 23.08.17 (i.e. the date of possession notice). As such, SA app. filed is barred by limitation.

Submitted.

Sd.

20/01/2018 Decline to number as barred by limitation under provision of Sec.17(1) of SARFAESI Act, 2002.

A.R/Reg i/c

Sd.

20/1/18

2. Contending inter alia that the Registry of the Tribunal has usurped the powers of the tribunal in declining to number S.A.Sr.No.168 of 2018 as barred by limitation under the provisions of Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, instant writ petition is filed.

3. Though, Mr.Vignesh Venkat, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in C.Sakthivel and Ors Vs. The Authorised Officer, State Bank of India and Ors dated 21.12.2016, to which one of us (Hon'ble Mr.Justice S.Manikumar), is a party, and submitted that at paragraph No.34 of the order, this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would be applicable to Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, 2002, and that therefore, Registry of Debts Recovery Tribunal ought to have numbered SA SR.No.168 of 2018, we are not inclined to accept the said contention for the reason that in C.Sakthivel's case, there is no categorical declaration of law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would be applicable to Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. However, in the said judgment, this Court has granted liberty to the writ petitioners therein to challenge the sale certificate, subject matter of dispute.

4. In Ponnusamy and Smt. P.Shanthi Vs. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, rep. by its Registrar and The Corporation Bank, reported in 2009(2) CTC 302: 2009 (1) LW 954: (2009) 3 MLJ 1271, a learned Judge of this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would be applicable to Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, 2002.

5. Attention of this Court was invited to an order of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in A.Ranganayagi and others Vs. The Chief Manager, Southern Railway and others, reported in 2017 (5) LW 878: (2017) 8 MLJ 382: 2017 (2) WritLR 704, wherein Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, held that Registry by returning the writ petition, on the ground of maintainability virtually acted as the Court and exercised judicial function and the Registry has no authority to reject the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternate remedy.

6. Though reliance was placed on the above reported judgment, by Mr.Vignesh Venkat, learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that Registry cannot return a writ petition on the ground of maintainability, or barred by limitation, as the case may be, which is the function of the Court and that therefore, the impugned proceedings, dated 20.01.2018 of the Registry of Debts Recovery Tribunal, Coimbatore, has to be set aside, we are not inclined to do so, at this juncture.

7. At paragraph No.9 of the judgment in A.Ranganayagi's case, the Hon'ble Division Bench held as follows:

"9. The Registry by returning the writ petition on the ground of maintainability virtually acted as the Court and exercised judicial function. The Registry has no authority to reject the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. It is for the Court to decide whether the writ petition should be entertained in a matter, in spite of alternative remedy. It is always