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2018 Supreme(Mad) 2116

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
M.M. SUNDRESH, N.SATHISH KUMAR, JJ.
Abdul Raguman - Appellant
Versus
The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Trichirappalli Range and Ors - Respondents
W.A.(MD)No.746 of 2018 and C.M.P.(MD)No.4430 of 2018
Decided on : 20-08-2018

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr.A.S.Vijayaraghavan, For Mr.R.P.Ramachanthiran
For the Respondents:Mr.K.Saravanan, Government Advocate

Headnote:

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) – offence – quash – acquittal - the appellant is that the Criminal Court, after analysing the entire evidence, has acquitted the appellant, by judgment dated 31.12.2008. The entire allegation levelled against the appellant relates to the year 2000 that he, being a public servant, demanded bribe amount from the defacto complainant. In the process of the amount being handed over to one of the Assistants of the appellant, the Department of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption seized the amount. Thereafter, the appellant proceeded under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The same set of witnesses were examined before the Criminal Court and the Criminal Court has rightly acquitted the accused. Based on the similar allegation, the present charge memo was issued with such a huge delay. Held, Therefore, merely because the appellant was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt, it cannot be said that the charge memo issued within five months from the date of such acquittal is vitiated and liable to be quashed. Only in exceptional cases, the Court can exercise its discretion to interfere with the charges on the ground that charge memo was issued by the incompetent authority or the authority having no jurisdiction or allegations of mala fide are raised. At this stage, the Court has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges and it cannot take over the functions of the disciplinary authority. Therefore, we are of the view that there is no bar for initiating disciplinary proceedings even after acquittal of the criminal case - Writ Appeal is dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

1. Aggrieved over the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the Writ Petition to quash the charge memo dated 27.05.2009 issued by the first respondent, the present Writ Appeal has been filed.

2. The appellant/writ petitioner was prosecuted for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The above case, after a full-fledged trial, was ended in acquittal on 31.12.2008 in S.C.No.10 of 2001 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai. Thereafter, the first respondent issued a charge memo dated 27.05.2009 on the basis of the allegation, which was the subject matter of the criminal trial. Challenging the above said charge memo, the Writ Petition came to be filed. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition, by order dated 23.01.2018. Challenging the same, the present Writ Appeal came to be filed.

3. The main contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that the Criminal Court, after analysing the entire evidence, has acquitted the appellant, by judgment dated 31.12.2008. The entire allegation levelled against the appellant relates to the year 2000 that he, being a public servant, demanded bribe amount from the defacto complainant. In the process of the amount being handed over to one of the Assistants of the appellant, the Department of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption seized the amount. Thereafter, the appellant proceeded under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The same set of witnesses were examined before the Criminal Court and the Criminal Court has rightly acquitted the accused. Based on the similar allegation, the present charge memo dated 27.05.2009 was issued with such a huge delay.

4. It is the further contention of the learned counsel that the charges are sought to be proved by the same witnesses, who are already examined before the Criminal Court. Therefore, initiation of departmental proceedings is not maintainable in law. The learned Single Judge has not considered the above issue and simply dismissed the Writ Petition, which needs to be interfered with. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the following judgments:

(i) Union of India v. Naman Singh Shekhawat [2008(4) SCC 1];

(ii) Unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.12500 of 2017, dated 29.01.2018 [Union of India, rep. by the Chief Postmaster General, Tamil Nadu Circle, Chennai-600 002 and another v. M.B.Shajahan and another];

(iii) W.P.(MD)No.1070 of 2012, dated 05.12.2014 [N.Thanam vs. The Personal Assistant (General) to the District Collector, Office of the District Collector, Virudhunagar District and another]; and

(iv) W.P.No.23452 of 2010, dated 19.03.2012 [M.Asaithambi vs. The Director of Municipal Administration, Chepauk, Chennai-600 005 and two others].

5. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents submitted that the appellant was acquitted only on the ground of benefit of doubt. What is required to be seen in the departmental proceedings is only preponderance of probabilities. The authority has waited till the conclusion of the criminal trial. The appellant was acquitted only on 31.12.2008 and within a period of five months, charge memo has been issued. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is an inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo. Further, there is no mala fide attributed against the respondents. Hence, it is submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge is perfectly valid and it does not require any interference.

6. In the light of the above submissions, it has to be seen whether the charge memo issued by the first respondent dated 27.05.2009 is liable to be quashed?.

7. Admittedly, it is not in dispute that the appellant was prosecuted for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for the alleged act of receiving the bribe in the year 2000 for doing favour to the defacto compl





























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