Suppression of material facts alone cannot be a ground for rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC unless it affects the merits of the case and has been pleaded before the trial court.

1. Before the trial court, the petitioners herein had filed two applications. One in I.A.No.1464 of 2012 under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC to reject the plaint and another application in I.A.No.4083 of 2017 under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) of CPC to strike out the third defendant in the original suit. By two separate orders dated 05.07.2013 and 15.09.2017, both the applications were rejected. As against the said order passed in I.A.No.1464 of 2012, the petitioners herein had filed revision in CRP.No.4131 of 2013 as against the order passed in I.A.No.4083 of 2017, C.R.P.No.3779 of 2017 has been filed before this Court. Since the issue involved in both the applications as well as the orders passed are one and the same, the C.R.P's are disposed of by common order.

2. The petitioners herein are the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit before the trial court. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the first respondent herein had suppressed certain material facts with regard to execution of a sale deed, which will have a bearing on the entire cause of action. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that, in case these facts had been incorporated in the plaint, there would not be any cause of action and therefore the plaint is liable to be rejected. It is his contention that since the trial court has not considered these suppression of facts, the plaint is liable to be rejected. He further contended that the third defendant herein is neither a necessary party nor a proper party to the suit proceedings. He would submit that since the suit is one for partition, and the third defendant is the husband of the fifth defendant herein, admittedly he is not entitled for any share in the suit property. As such, he has been unnecessarily impleaded as a party and the defendants therefore seek for deletion of the third defendant from the suit.

3. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand would submit that the suppression of material facts in the plaint, is not fatal. According to him, the recitals in the documents produced with the plaint, itself is a self explanation and therefore specific pleadings are not required. Even otherwise, he submitted that the suppression of these facts would not entitle the petitioners herein to seek for rejection of the plaint. The learned counsel also submitted that this ground of suppression of facts, was not raised before the trial court in the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. Therefore, the petitioners would not be entitled to raise this ground in the present revision.

4. Insofar as the rejection of the third defendant from the suit is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the third defendant himself had admitted in the counter that he is not entitled for any share in the property. Above all, the application to delete the third defendant from the suit proceedings had been made only by the defendants 1 and 2 and since the third defendant here has not chosen to file any application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC., these petitioners are not entitled to seek for deletion of the third defendant from the suit proceedings.

5. I had given careful consideration to the submissions made by the respective counsels. This is a suit for partition. Before adverting to the grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in the present revision, it will be appropriate to look into the scope of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC, in the light of the ground raised by the petitioners herein before this Court. One of the main grounds raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners seeking for the rejection of the plaint is that, certain material facts are suppressed in the plaint and if the plaintiffs have not suppressed such material facts, it would not have created any cause of action for filing the suit. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1994 (1) SCC 1 [S.P.Chenga