Impleading a third party in a suit for specific performance would effectively convert it into a title suit, which is impermissible.

M.S. Ramesh, J.

The present revision has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the learned Principal Sub-ordinate Judge, Coimbatore in I.A.No.918 of 2013 in O.S.No.248 of 2012 dated 21.01.2016.

2. Heard Mr.Siddharth, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.S.Gunalan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner, who is the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.248 of 2012 filed for the relief of specific performance wherein, the first respondent herein is a third party to the proceedings in the above suit. He submitted that the first respondent had filed an application in I.A.No.918 of 2013 under Order 1 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure to implead himself as a party in the above suit. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the first respondent had filed an earlier suit seeking for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction before the learned I Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore in O.S.No.1292 of 2007 and the petitioner/plaintiff in the present suit in O.S.No.248 of 2012 and the defendants were all parties in the earlier suit viz., O.S.No.1292 of 2007. The learned counsel further submitted that since the suit is one for specific performance and the first respondent herein is not a party to the sale agreement dated 18.05.2007, he is not entitled to be impleaded as a defendant since he is a stranger to the agreement. In support of this, the learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Karsondas Thakkar vs. Kiran Construction Co., (2008) 13 SCC 658. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent herein was not a party to the sale agreement dated 18.05.2007 which was entered into between the third defendant in the suit with the plaintiff and the fourth defendant. As such, the learned counsel submits that the trial Court had erred by allowing the impleading petition and hence, prays to set aside the order passed by the Court below.

4. The learned counsel for the first respondent on the other hand submitted that the sale deed dated 28.08.2006 through which the first respondent herein claims right over the properties is the subject matter in the earlier suit and hence, he claims to be a proper and necessary party in the present suit also. The learned counsel further submitted that since the judgment to be passed in the present suit might have an impact on his rights over the suit property, he has to be impleaded as a party to the suit and therefore, the Court below has rightly allowed the application by impleading the first respondent.

5. I have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the respective counsels.

6. Before going into the contentions of either side, the core question involved in the present revision that requires to be answered as to whether the third party to an agreement for sale, can claim right to be impleaded in the suit for specific performance. This issue came up before the Hon'ble Apex Court for consideration and while holding that the scope of consideration for specific performance cannot be converted into one for a title suit, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Karsondas Thakkar vs. Kiran Construction Co., (2008) 13 SCC 658 had held that a stranger to an agreement cannot fall within the category of parties to the agreement. The relevant portion of the said order reads as follows:

"28. Along with that is the other question, which very often raises its head in suits for specific performance, that is, whether a stranger to an agreement for sale can be added as a party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in view of Section 15 of the Specific Relief act, 1963. The relevant provision of Section 15 with which we are concerned is contained in clause (a) thereof and entitles any party to the contract to seek specific performance of such contract. Admittedly, the appe