The Court established that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to declare the act of an authority as illegal and void in case of a violation of fundamental principles of natural justice.

S. Ramathilagam, J.

This Second Appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and Decree of the Principal District Judge, Trichy in A.S.No.338 of 2004, dated 16.06.2003, confirming the judgment and decree made in O.S. No. 340 of 1995 on the file of Principal District Munsif Court, Trichy.

2. The brief facts of the plaintiff's case in O.S.No.340 of 1995 is that the plaintiff joined the defendant's institution as a steno Typist cum Clerk in the year 1980. On her completion of probation, she reported to duty at the Secretariat Division at Chennai. She gave a requisition to transfer her from Chennai to Tiruchirappalli on account of fixing of her marriage and as her would be was settled at Tiruchirapalli. Hence, she was transferred to Tiruchirapalli as per Rule 90(g)(iii) of Tamilnadu Electricity Board Service Regulations on her requisition.

3. While she was working at Tiruchirappalli, after completion of 10 years of service, she was moved to Selection Grade. Four years thereafter, there was an objection from the audit as per Ex.B.3 the order permitting her to move to the Selection Grade was cancelled vide Ex.A.7. The service of Steno Typists in the Secretariat Branch is not different from the service in the Mofussil. The conditions of service, the rights and duties of the Steno Typists in both the divisions are one and the same. Hence the plaintiff challenged the cancellation order Ex.A.7 before the District Munsif Court, Tiruchirapalli.

4. The case of the defendant is that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the plaintiff. Orders of movement to Selection Grade dated 19.9.1990 was issued to the plaintiff taking into account of her service including the service rendered in the Secretariat Branch and that was objected by the Audit Authorities on the ground that services rendered at Secretariat Branch should not be taken into account for fixation of seniority as per the conditions for transfer stipulated by the Board. The same should not have been taken in to account for movement to Selection Grade. The objection of the audit authorities was submitted to the Chief Engineer and the Chief Engineer upheld the audit objection. Therefore the orders issued for movement to Selection Grade was cancelled.

5. The further contention of the defendants 1 to 3 are that the Tamilnadu Electricity Board Service Regulation 90 (g)(a)(iii) and (h)(i) if approved probationer is transferred permanently from one office in one departmental unit to any office in another departmental unit, she has to forgo her right to seniority and she has to take the rank last in the list of probationers or approved probationers as the case may be.

6. While giving transfer application, plaintiff gave an undertaking that (a) she will forego her right to seniority on the basis of date of her first appointment. (b) She will take the rank last in the list of probationer as on date of her join in the Tiruchirappalli Electricity Distribution Circle and (c) She will forgo her transfer travelling allowance for the transfer. Therefore the plaintiff is estopped from contending otherwise. Hence the order of cancellation of movement to selection grade is in order and therefore the plaintiff has no cause to complain and the case cannot be prosecuted before the Civil Court and further the claim is also barred by limitation.

7. Based on the pleadings of both the parties, the trial court has framed as many as six issues.

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8. The trial court accepting the contention of the plaintiff decreed the suit. Challenging the judgment and decree of the District Munsif Court, the defendant preferred the appeal before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court based on the pleadings and documentary evidence has raised the following points for consideration.

'1. Whether the undertaking given by the plaintiff that she would take the last rank in the place of joining would be binding upon the plaintiff?

2. Whether the services rendered by the plaintiff at the of