The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the terms of the lease agreement and the applicability of special provisions over general laws.

1. The order dated July 2005 issued by the respondent directing the writ petitioner to pay the arrears of enhanced rent of Rs.1,98,641/- is under challenge in the present writ petition.

2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner states that, the writ petitioner firm got a lease of a salt shed at Tondiarpet, belonging to the first respondent. The terms of lease were fixed as per the letter of acceptance dated 24.02.2000. The monthly rent fixed for the shed leased out was Rs.3500/- or the rent to be fixed by CPWD whichever is higher. The rental period was one year only from the date of receipt of a letter dated 29.03.2000.

3. The other amenity charges were also to be paid by the writ petitioner firm. The lease period was extended from time to time and the writ petitioner was paying the monthly rent to the first respondent promptly. There was no arrears of rent. While so, the first respondent issued a demand notice on 05.05.2003 for the first time, claiming the amount of Rs.1,33,808/- purported to be a differential rent for the period from 01.04.2000 to 31.03.2003 as if the monthly rent was fixed as Rs.7,328/-.

4. The writ petitioner submitted a reply stating that the agreed monthly rent was Rs.3,500/- and therefore, the unilateral enhancement of rent by the respondents as Rs.7,328/- is untenable. The fixation done by the respondents were not in consonance with the terms and conditions of the lease and the unilateral decision taken is impermissible under the provisions of the law.

5. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner is of an opinion that, the fixation of rent or enhancement must be done with the consent of the parties concerned. There was no consent on the part of the writ petitioner, thus, the Suo moto fixation deserves no consideration and accordingly, the writ petitioner is not liable to pay the arrears of enhanced rent as claimed by the respondent in the impugned notice. There is no provisions under the Act for fixation of higher rent. In the absence of any such provision, the Authorities Competent cannot enhance the rent. More specifically, suo moto and without obtaining any consent from the lessee.

6. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner cited the judgment of the Apex Court of India in the case of Banatwala and Company Vs. L.I.C of India & Other reported in AIR 2011 SC 3619. The learned counsel referred paragraph 63 of the judgment which reads as under:-

“On ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil courts

63. We may next deal with the contention of the respondents that the exclusionary clauses are to be read strictly. In Church of North India [(2005) 10 SCC 760], relied upon by the respondents, this Court was concerned with a suit for declaration as to the succession to a particular trust governed under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Such a suit was squarely covered under that Act and, therefore, it was held that the civil court will not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The seven principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.[AIR 1969 SC 78] were relied upon in that case. It is sufficient to refer to the first two principles therefrom which are as follows: (AIR p. 89, para 32)

“(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.”

If we apply these two te