The main legal point established in the given judgment is the determination of the domain jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India over the issues raised in the present Appeals.

JUDGMENT

(Prayer: Appeals filed under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 against the Final Order No.40787 of 2017 dated 15.05.2017 and Final Order Nos.41415 & 41416 of 2017 dated 02.08.2017 on the file of the CESTAT, South Zonal Bench, Chennai.)

Common Judgment

Dr. Vineet Kothari, J.

1. The Revenue Department has filed the present Appeals raising certain alleged substantial questions of law arising from the order of the learned CESTAT in the orders dated 15.05.2017 and 12.08.2017. The present Appeals were admitted by a Coordinate Bench of this Court on 09 April, 2018 and the said questions are as follows:

“1. Whether the availment of CENVAT credit under Rule 3 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 is legal when the activity undertaken by the assessee do not amount to manufacture as contemplated in Section 2 f (iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944?

2. Whether the activity of re-packing which is not packing in “unit containers” by the assessee would amount to manufacture as contemplated under Section 2 (f) (iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for the purpose of availing CENVAT Credit?

3. Whether the activity of re-labeling with the name and without any hologram or marking while the re-labeling being done only for the logistics purpose by the assessee would amount to manufacture as contemplated under Section 2 (f) (iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for the purpose of availing CENVAT Credit.

4. Whether the treatment to the already marketable products by the assessee would amount to manufacture as contemplated Section 2(f) (iii) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for the purpose of availing CENVAT Credit.

5. When the assessee being both a manufacturer and a trader, mere filing of a Return under Rule 12 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 would amount to disclosure of all the details of CENVAT Credit and therefore, extended period of limitation is not invocable?”

2. When the matter was taken up for hearing, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent/Assessee Mr.N.Venkataraman raised a preliminary objection of the maintainability of the present Appeals filed by the Revenue under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 in this Court and submitted that as per the provisions of Section 35L, particularly Section 35L(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (in short ‘the Act’) the question of excisability also is within the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and not of the High Court as per Section 35G of the Act and therefore, the present Appeals filed by the Revenue are not maintainable and the same deserves to be dismissed on the said preliminary objection. On the said preliminary objection, he relied upon the following judgments:-

(i) Commissioner of C. Ex. Pondicherry Vs. CESTAT, Chennai, (2016) 44 S.T.R. 576 (Mad.)

(ii) Commissioner of Customs, Chennai Vs. Ashu Exports, (2009) 240 E.L.T. 333 (Mad.)

(iii) Commissioner of C. Ex., Chennai- II Vs. Vadapalani Press, (2015) 320 E.L.T. 238 (Mad.)

(iv) Thejo Engineering Services Private Limited Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. Chennai-II, (2017) 349 E.L.T. 113 (Mad.)

(v) SRF Ltd. Vs. CESTAT, Chennai, (2017) 350 E.L.T. 33 (Mad.)

3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Appellant/ Revenue Mr.A.P.Srinivas relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Navin Chemicals Mfg. & Trading Co. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs, [1993 (4) SCC 320] to make a feeble effort to maintain the present Appeals before this Court in view of Section 35G of the Act.

4. We have heard the learned counsels and given our earnest consideration to the Judgments relied upon by both sides and the provisions of the Act.

5. Let us first quoted both the relevant provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 viz., Section 35G and 35L for ready reference.

“35G. Appeal to High Court

(1) An Appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having