ORDER :

R. Subramanian, J.

1. Challenge in this revision by the legal representatives of the defendants in O.S. No. 104 of 1977 is to the order of the learned District Munsif at Coonoor, allowing the execution petition in E.P. No. 10 of 2018 filed by the decree holder seeking possession of the property subject matter of the said suit.

2. The suit in O.S. No. 104 of 1977 was laid by the respondent seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 14.07.1975 entered into between the predecessors in interest of the petitioners and the first respondent herein. The said suit came to be decreed after contest on 27.07.1978. An appeal was taken there from to this Court in A.S. No. 46 of 1979, which was also dismissed. Further letters patent appeal in LPA. No. 29 of 1986 by the defendants in O.S. No. 104 of 1977 also came to be dismissed on 30.11.1989. There were no further proceedings and the judgment and decree in the suit became final. The decree holder/first respondent filed an execution petition in E.P. No. 51 of 1991 on the file of the District Court, Ootacamund, which was subsequently transferred to Sub-Court, Ootacamund and numbered as E.P. No. 10 of 1995. Again, the same was transferred to the District Munsif Court, Coonoor and renumbered as E.P. No. 30 of 1996.

3. After stiff contest, the sale deed came to be executed and registered on 06.11.2013. The judgment debtors filed E.A. Nos. 11 and 12 of 2013 to reopen the execution petition and for appointment of Commissioner. Those petitions were dismissed by the Executing Court on 13.02.2014. A revision against the said order also came to be dismissed on 17.11.2016. In the interregnum, the decree holder filed an execution petition for delivery of possession. The said execution petition came to be numbered as E.P. No. 10 of 2018 and the same was allowed on 05.07.2018. The order dated 05.07.2018 is the subject matter of this revision.

4. Heard Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Srinath Sridevan, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. The other respondents have been given up.

5. Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently contend that the execution petition for possession itself is not maintainable in as much as there is no prayer for possession made in the suit. Reliance in this regard is placed by the learned counsel on Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Relying heavily upon sub-section 2 of Section 22, Mr. V. Raghavachari would contend that in the absence of a prayer for possession in a suit for specific performance and in the absence of the plaintiff seeking an amendment to the plaint to include the relief of possession, the Court, particularly, after the enactment of the 1963 Act, cannot direct delivery of possession in execution proceedings. The learned counsel would also draw my attention to various pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts in support of his contentions.

6. Contending contra, Mr. Srinath Sridevan, learned counsel for the first respondent would submit that the introduction of Section 22 in the 1963 Act would not have the effect of negating the position of law as it stood prior to the enactment of Section 22. He would also add that despite the introduction of Section 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the relief of possession is inbuilt in a decree for specific performance and it need not be claimed separately, as the same is incidental to that of execution of a deed of conveyance. He would also contend that the right to possession accrues only when the suit for specific performance is decreed and therefore, there need not be a separate prayer for possession. He would also rely upon various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts in support of his submissions.

7. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it will be useful to reproduce Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

"22. Power to grant relief for posses