Discretionary orders under Section 143 A (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act must be supported by reasons, as orders without reasons are illegal and subject to being set aside.

JUDGMENT :

(Prayer : Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to set aside the order passed in C.M.P.No.527 of 2020 dated 22/3/2022 in S.T.C.No.9502 of 2019 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.V, Salem.)

This Criminal Original Petition has been filed to quash the order, dated 22/3/2022, passed in C.M.P.No.527 of 2020 in S.T.C.No.9502 of 2019, on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.V, Salem, for the offences punishable under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

2. Heard Mr.S.Conscious Ilango, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.R.Nalliyappan, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the lower Court without assigning any reason as to why such a direction is given against the petitioners is on the face of it illegal.

4. Perused the materials available on record.

5. In C.M.P.No.527 of 2020 in S.T.C.No.9502 of 2019, the learned Judicial Magistrate No.5, Salem, vide order, dated 22/3/2022, allowed the petition for interim compensation stating that even though the petitioners have valid case that can be adjusted during the recording of evidence and enquiry and that as per Section 143 A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is mandatory that when the complaint has been taken on file and held that the respondent/complainant is entitled to maximum at the rate of 20% of cheque amount.

6. It is very useful to extract Section 143 A of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Power to direct interim compensation

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) the Court trying an offence under Section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant -

(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint and

(b). in any other case, upon framing of charge

2. The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of the cheque.

(3). The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-Section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque.

(4). If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.”

7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners produced a copy of this Court made in L.G.R.Enterprises, rep. By its Proprietrix Sindu @ Lakshmi & Others Vs. P. Anbazhagan, (Crl.O.P.Nos.15438 and 15440 of 2019), wherein at paragraph No.18, it is held as follows:-

18. A careful reading of the order passed by the Court below shows that the Court below has focussed more on the issue of the prospective/retrospective operation of the amendment. The Court has not given any reason as to why it is directing the accused persons to pay an interim compensation of 20% to the complainant. As held by this Court, the discretionary power that is vested with the trial Court in ordering for interim compensation must be supported by reasons and unfortunately, in this case, it is not supported by reasons. The attempt made by the learned counsel for the respondent to read certain reasons into the order, cannot be done by this Court, since this Court is testing the application of mind of the Court below while passing the impugned order by exercising its discretion and this Court cannot attempt to supplement it with the reasons argued by the learned counsel for the respondent.

8. A reading of Section 143 A of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the